Cybersecurity Conference at Fordham Law

I'm off to Tokyo for a week, but before I go, wanted to flag a really interesting looking upcoming conference at Fordham Law School.  It's entitled, Cyber Attacks: International Cybersecurity in the 21st Century and will take place next Friday, February 25, 2011.  The program is free, subject to registration (see here).  The line-up looks great too:  9:00am–9:30am Registration 09:30am–10:00am Welcome 10:00am–11:45am Cyber Attacks and the Law of Armed Conflict Moderator: Prof....

Even when Moreno-Ocampo wins, he loses.  Pre-Trial Chamber II recently rejected a request by Mohammed Hussein Ali, one of the six Kenyans for whom the OTP has sought summonses, to submit "observations" on the investigation  That was an easy call; nothing in the Rome Statute permits a suspect to participate in the investigative process so early.  The Pre-Trial Chamber nevertheless...

Pennumbra, the on-line companion to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, is hosting the debate.  John's opening statement and my reply -- which is something of a misnomer, because the reply doesn't directly address John's arguments -- are currently available.  Both focus on Judge Bates' opinion dismissing the ACLU/CCR lawsuit; I argue that, contrary to the Judge's claim, his opinion...

Today an Ecuador court fined Chevron $8.6 billion for environmental damage. According to the Wall Street Journal, $5.4 billion of that is to restore polluted soil, $1.4 billion to create a health system for the community, $800 million to treat individuals injured by the pollution, $600 million to restore polluted waters, $200 million to restore native species, $150 million...

It's been a while since I checked in on the WikiLeaks kerfuffle, so now that the HILJ symposium is over -- and I thought it was great -- I wanted to flag this recent article in the Wall Street Journal, which reports that the government has found no evidence that WikiLeaks or Julian Assange solicited or conspired with Bradley Manning...

[Eric A. Posner, co-author of Universal Exceptionalism in International Law with Anu Bradford, responds to Robert Ahdieh] I am grateful for Professor Ahdieh’s illuminating comments on my paper with Anu Bradford. Ahdieh offers three interpretations of the charge of U.S. exceptionalism: Degreeism: The United States does not always win, but it wins more often than Europe and China do. Exceptionalism is a matter of degree, but it still exists. I don’t think that the traditional notion of American exceptionalism permits this interpretation, but it is possible that people misuse the word “exceptionalism” in the way that Ahdieh describes. Still, our purpose was to cast doubt on the appropriateness of exceptionalism (and, a fortiori, degreeism) as a moral category. Rather than criticizing states for being exceptionalist, we should focus on the relative normative appeal of the competing exceptionalist visions. An exceptionalist country that always gets its way, or a country that merely gets its way more often than other countries, may be a good country. Such country may also be “better” than the others, which is why we don’t sympathize with North Korea and Myanmar, which rarely get their way, and we retrospectively cheer on the British when they abolished the international slave trade. Everything depends on whether getting its way helps or hurts others—not whether a country is exceptionalist or not or the degree to which it can enforce its exceptionalist view. Presentationism:

[Robert Ahdieh, the Associate Dean of the Faculty, Professor of Law, and Director of the Center on Federalism and Intersystemic Governance at Emory University School of Law, responds to Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal Exceptionalism in International Law] In Universal Exceptionalism in International Law, Professors Anu Bradford and Eric Posner help to advance our understanding of international order in at least two respects. To begin, there is the distinction they draw (if sometimes imperfectly) between the familiar trope of “exceptionalism” – a term most commonly found with “American” in front of it – and the distinct concept of “exemptionalism.” As I will suggest below, I have some doubt about the definitional premise on which the Article is based. The notion that we should distinguish between a desire to have one’s values reflected in international law and a desire to operate beyond its strictures, however, has the potential to offer valuable leverage in the discourse of international law and relations. I was also struck by their systematic analysis of each of the states/regions of relevant interest – Europe, China, and the United States. It is beyond my expertise to assess the substantive accuracy of their review of distinct patterns of exceptionalism in each locale. Their embrace of what I would cast as a “microanalytic” approach to the question presented, however, holds great promise – perhaps especially when played out within a broader framework, such as the exceptionalism versus exemptionalism approach they advance. Notwithstanding these contributions, I have significant doubts about the conclusion that Bradford and Posner would have us take away from their Article.

[The following summary is the abstract from Universal Exceptionalism in International Law by Anu Bradford (an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School) & Eric A. Posner (the Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School).] A trope of international law scholarship is that the United States is an “exceptionalist” nation, one...

[Zenichi Shishido, a Professor at the Graduate School of International Corporate Strategy, Hitotsubashi University, responds to John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs and Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework] It is a great pleasure to be able to comment on Armour, Jacobs, & Milhaupt’s excellent analytical, comparative study on a major issue of corporate governance. The article is focused on hostile takeover regimes and, at the same time, covers wide areas of the world, including three developed and three emerging capital markets. It is also important to note that they provide an analytical framework for analyzing different modes of business law reform in general, from the perspective of demand- and supply-side factors, which could be applied to a wide range of legal reforms. The article starts by raising a good question of why the regulatory responses to hostile takeovers are very different among the three countries who share the similar capital markets (the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan).