[Jens Ohlin is Associate Professor of Law at Cornell Law School] Cross-posted at LieberCode. So the ICC has released its first verdict and it only took 10 years. Most media reports are concentrating on the substantive crime – the use of child soldiers – because that issue has suddenly gained popular currency with the Kony2012 viral video. But the Lubanga decision is also...
I am grateful to Professor Brown’s careful summary of the thesis of When International Law Works. I should, however, make a few clarifying points about my analysis of some international incidents. Professor Brown, with gentlemanly understatement, notes that “some will have their eyebrows raised” by my analysis. Regarding Loewen v. United States, I confess I am rather ambivalent about the award. ...
[Chester Brown is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Sydney] In international life, decision-makers face difficult problems on a regular basis. What should decision-makers do, for instance, when international rules that “promote minimum world order and universally-desired values” run counter to, or threaten, “basic values or essential interests of communities” that those decision-makers serve (p. 2)? ...
[Robert Howse is the Lloyd C. Nelson Professor of International Law at NYU School of Law] When International Law Works is a wide-ranging work with many important and original claims and arguments. Particularly congenial is the approach that the real world effects of international law be examined not through narrow studies of rule "compliance" but in a manner that takes into...
From AllAfrica.com: Today, International Criminal Court (ICC) judges in The Hague delivered the Court's first verdict—a finding of guilt against former Congolese warlord Thomas Lubanga. Prosecutors accused Lubanga of the war crimes of conscripting, enlisting, and using children under the age of 15 years for combat purposes while he served as political head of the Union of Congolese...
I agree with Professor Cheng that legal theory does not have to be predictive to be successful. But I wonder if he sets the bar a bit too low. In his previous post, he writes: Providing a framework of analysis to address international problems, to guide but not control, is perhaps the best that can be done. It may also be...
In a previous post, I noted that Peter Berkowitz defended the legality of a U.S. or Israeli attack on Iran's non-existent nuclear weapons program by invoking U.S. practice -- and only U.S. practice. He now has offered another defense of such an attack in response to an editorial by Bruce Ackerman in the L.A Times. Unfortunately, Berkowitz's second article is...
[John Knox is Professor of Law at Wake Forest Law School] The Supreme Court’s decision to send Kiobel back for reargument on whether the Alien Tort Statute allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations in foreign territory will focus attention on the presumption against extraterritoriality, as Anthony Colangelo pointed out in his recent...
Panel 3 of the NYU JILP Vol. 44:2 Online Symposium
Thomas Spijkerboer is professor of migration law at VU University Amsterdam. His publications in English include Gender and Refugee Status (Ashgate, 2000), Women and Immigration Law (Routledge, 2007, edited volume with Sarah van Walsum), and Fleeing Homophobia (VU University Amsterdam/COC Nederland, 2011, with Sabine Jansen). A couple of weeks ago, a friend of mine who works for the Dutch asylum authorities told me an example of why he feels uneasy about the Dutch asylum policy towards gay Iraqi asylum seekers. The short version, which is sufficient for our purposes, is that a man was badly beaten because he was (correctly) thought to be gay because he wore very tight jeans. Even from this short summary, it is clear that this man was subjected to persecution on account of his being gay. Such past persecution as a result of membership of a particular social group gives rise to a presumption of a well-founded fear of being persecuted in the future; state practice to this effect has been codified in Article 4(4) of EU Directive 2004/83. The Hathaway/Pobjoy article gives ample arguments to deny this claim, allowing this man to return to a situation in which he has a well-founded fear of being persecuted on account of being gay. The reason why they argue that this claim has to be denied is because “[w]here risk accrues only by virtue of an applicant having engaged in an activity no more than peripherally associated with sexual identity – including where risk arises from an imputation of sexual identity derived solely from having engaged in such activity – it cannot be reasonably said to be a risk that arises “ ‘for reasons of’ sexual orientation.” Without any doubt, dressing in tight jeans is in the same category as the examples taken from Lord Rodgers’ statement which apparently so turns on Hathaway and Pobjoy: attending Kylie concerts, drinking exotically colored drinks, and doing boy talk. The Hathaway/Pobjoy argument leads to denial of a refugee claim, which clearly should not be denied. Something is fundamentally wrong with their argument. I posit that their article has two problems. The first is an incorrect application of refugee law doctrine – surprising, because Hathaway’s 1991 book is such an impressive doctrinal analysis. The second consists of the fantasy (current among legal scholars, therefore less surprising) that law and politics can be meaningfully separated.Panel 3 of the NYU JILP Vol. 44:2 Online Symposium
S. Chelvan is a Barrister at No5 Chambers, London; a PhD candidate in law at King’s College London; and a UK Country Expert and External Expert to the Advisory Board for the Fleeing Homophobia project. He is known as "a doyen of immigration cases involving issues of sexual identity.” (Chambers UK 2012).“An Englishman, Irishman and a Scotsman walk into a bar. The barman asks the Scotsman . . . .”
“To illustrate the point with trivial stereotypical examples from British society: just as male heterosexuals are free to enjoy themselves playing rugby, drinking beer and talking about girls with their mates, so male homosexuals are to be free to enjoy themselves going to Kylie concerts, drinking exotically coloured cocktails and talking about boys with their straight female mates.”What is the similarity, and then the difference, between the two passages above? The similarity is that most readers would accept that they each illustrate an example of British humour. The difference? Some observers read the second reference, taken from § 78 of Lord Rodger’s reasoning in the U.K. Supreme Court case of HJ, not to be illustrative of anything linked to humour, but rather a blatant attack on fundamental principles underlying refugee law. I align myself to the first scenario and aim in this short note to analyse why concentrating on excluding certain categories of conduct from protection misses the point. Kendall (2003 citing Mahoney J.A. in Thavakaran), rejects an approach where the “onus for removing the fear of persecution [is] on the victim, rather than the perpetrator” (see also Johnson, 2007: 107 fn. 30). What is at the core of the reasoning of the U.K. Supreme Court is not a right to what some observers may describe as “peripheral conduct”, but a right not to be persecuted, for reasons of sexual identity. Verdirame’s limitation on the conduct of a gay man, which went “beyond” what a straight man can exercise in the public sphere, is echoed in an earlier 2005 UK Asylum and Immigration Tribunal decision of AT (Homosexuals: need for discretion?) Iran [2005] UKAIT 00119. The AIT held, at § 28, in one of its most controversial determinations that resulted in complaints from the U.K. NGO’s UKLGIG and Stonewall, that:
"Whether there is or is not a ‘core right’ for persons of any sexual orientation to conduct themselves with discretion in their public sexual practices is not something we need in our view decide, though we should have thought that such discretion was part of the ordinary consensus of civilized mankind (and still more so of a number of races considered ‘uncivilized,’ so far as they still exist). The reason is that this appellant on our findings of fact, and his own expressed intentions for the future, has never shown the slightest wish to engage in homosexual conduct in any way in the face of the public or the authorities, such as might expose him to any real risk, on the background evidence, on return to Iran. Whether he has or does not have a ‘core right’ to go in for that sort of thing, his return will not expose him either to Convention persecution or ill-treatment."There are only three examples I can call upon to illustrate a rare and clearly ignorant approach to the exercise of public sex, being centrally connected with a refugee claim in the U.K. In XY (Iran) (2008), counsel for the appellant argued to the England and Wales Court of Appeal not to remove his gay client because he would be returned to a life of sex in the public bath houses and he would not be able to have sex in the family home [§ 14]. Secondly, the stance of the U.K. Home Office for many years with respect to the alleged existence of cruising in a Tehran park, where men were able to pick up other men for sex, was that this indicated an ability to be gay in Iran, and therefore gay men were not refugees. The third, and final example, is in the case of Hylton [2003] EWHC 1992 (Admin), where Counsel for the U.K. Home Office submitted that the risk group in Jamaica was limited to “a homosexual prostitute or homosexuals who cruise in particular areas” [§ 11] (position reversed in DW (2005) (AIT)).
Panel 1 of the NYU JILP Vol. 44:2 Online Symposium
Lucy Yeatman is a lecturer in law at the University of Greenwich, teaching Family Law and Human Rights Law. Her research focuses on same-sex parents and the law, and LGBTI asylum seekers and refugees. Hathaway and Pobjoy argue that the decisions in S395 and HJ and HT achieved the right result for the asylum seekers involved, but for the wrong reasons. They go on to argue that there were two ways in which the reasoning in both cases was flawed: first, in the reliance on the threat of exogenous harm which could not be objectively established and in consequence not giving due consideration to the threat of endogenous harm caused by enforced concealment; and second, in the failure to place any kind of limitation on the type of behaviour associated with sexual orientation that might give rise to protection under the Refugee Convention. As John Tobin quite rightly concludes, “credit is due to Hathaway and Pobjoy for seeking to develop a stronger jurisprudential foundation on which to base claims for refugee status of GLBTI applicants” and he welcomes the emphasis they place on psychological harm as an important contribution to a “shift in the narrative of persecution.” This paper will however object to the approach taken by Hathaway and Pobjoy for five reasons. First, a distinction is drawn between requiring someone to return home and conceal their sexual orientation, and finding that if returned home, they will “for seclusion.” They accept that there can be no basis in refugee law for requiring concealment, but argue that in both S395 and HJ and HT the appellants were not being required to conceal their sexual orientation but were opting to do so. The UKSC quite rightly rejected this distinction,[1] as the asylum seeker is not choosing to conceal their identity. In fact, by virtue of having sought asylum in a country that recognises the rights of lesbian and gay people to live free from discrimination, the claimant is quite clearly opting not to conceal their identity. If their asylum claim fails and they are returned home then this is not a choice. Second, Hathaway and Pobjoy go on to argue, that where a person opts for concealment, it is not possible to identify a risk of persecutory harm. The UKSC directly addressed this point by requiring examination of the reasons for concealment. Lord Rodger was satisfied that if a claimant would conceal the fact he is gay in order to avoid persecution, then this is prima facie an indication that there is a threat of persecution.[2] Hathaway and Pobjoy describe this approach as “riding roughshod over their responsibility to identify the risk of persecutory harm” because refugee law requires an objective analysis of a risk of harm. Yet at no point does the UKSC suggest that this is a purely subjective test, the judgments of their Lordships clearly require evidence that if the claimant were “out” they would risk persecution. The objective test is there. Yet Hathaway and Pobjoy’s approach suggests that concealing your sexual orientation is a simple process that involves easily made modification of behaviour; otherwise they would surely recognise that a life of concealment always carries with it the risk of discovery. In fact the story of HT is a good example of this. He managed to live discreetly for many years, before a lack of extreme caution exposed him to his neighbours and to a viscous attack that left him hospitalised and vulnerable to further violence.v If a person is hiding their true identity due to a fear of persecution, if that fear is well-founded, then they are always at risk of exposure and persecution.