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Justice Scalia’s Rule of Law Efforts

by Duncan Hollis

Scalia photo

Justice Scalia’s passing comes as a shock and is generating tributes across ideological lines. Indeed, whether you agreed with his opinions or not (and I was not a fan of his thinking on cases like Sosa or Bond), Justice Scalia’s opinions deserved to be read.  Lines like “never-say-never jurisprudence” and “oh-so-close-to-relevant cases” are some of my personal favorites.  Readers should feel free to add their own in the comment section.

In the meantime, I wanted to pay tribute to a side of Justice Scalia that has garnered relatively little attention — his dedication to promoting the rule of law.  For the last sixteen years, Temple Law has run a rule of law program in Beijing hosted at Tsinghua University’s School of Law.  We offer an LLM to classes of 50 Chinese judges, prosecutors and lawyers, in an effort to acquaint them with the U.S. legal system and the rule of law more generally.  As part of the program, the Chinese students visit Philadelphia for the summer, which includes a day trip to D.C.  And nearly every year the highlight of that D.C. trip was an hour long private audience with Justice Scalia.  Justice Scalia would speak for a few minutes but most of the time was devoted to answering student questions. We conducted the sessions off the record, so I do not feel comfortable opining on who said what, but I always came away impressed by the honesty, vigor and intellectual quality of the exchange. I was universally impressed with Justice Scalia’s wit and candor.  He offered the students a true model of free speech in the U.S. legal tradition.  I don’t know if Temple’s China program was the only time he did this, or if this effort was one of many to expand the rule of law.  But I can say it was a highly effective one.  And so, as the nation mourns the passing of one of its most opinionated justices, I wanted to offer my own small tribute of appreciation to a man who, for whatever else he believed, was committed to the idea of democracy and the values of liberty and equality on which it stood.

International Law Movies

by Kristen Boon

After attending a great panel at ESIL in 2014 on International Law and Film, I’ve been thinking about how to integrate film into my public international law class. I’ve compiled a list of international law films (with help from colleagues and fellow bloggers) that make for excellent viewing.  In a subsequent post, I’ll offer some thoughts about teaching international law through film.

Dramatizations

Zero Dark Thirty (Bin Laden)

Team America (Terrorism, North Korea and WMDs) (not on the serious side of international law movies!)

The Interpreter (filmed in the UN)

Argo (Iran Hostage Crisis)

The Reader (War Crimes Trial in Germany)

Battle of Algiers (Algerian War of Independence)

Hotel Rwanda (Genocide in Rwanda)

Woman in Gold (Nazi Art Theft, FSIA)

The Whistleblower (Post-War Bosnia)

Captain Phillips (Piracy)

Blood Diamond (Conflict Diamonds)

Lord of War (Arms Dealing)

War Witch (Child Soldiers)

Star Wars (Trade Dispute prompts Armed Conflict in Outer Space) J

Bridge of Spies (Cold War)

The Constant Gardener (Diplomacy, Pharmaceuticals, British High Commission in Kenya)

Judgment at Nuremberg (Nuremberg Trials)

Documentaries

The Reckoning (The ICC)

Last Station before Hell (UN peacekeeping)

Sons of the Clouds:  The Lost Colony (Western Sahara)

The Gatekeepers (Shin Bet)

Taxi to the Darkside (Torture, Afghanistan)

All Rise (Jessup Competition)

 

An alternate list of international law films compiled by Lyonette Louis-Jacques at the University of Chicago Law Library with more foreign / older content available is here.

Do you have additional movie ideas?  Please add other titles using the comments box below.

The First Annual Michael Lewis Memorial Teleforum on “Defining the Law of War”

by Julian Ku

As many of our readers may recall, the late Professor Michael Lewis was a great friend of this blog and an important voice in U.S. international law and national security scholarship.  To honor his memory, the Federalist Society has recently launched the first annual Michael Lewis Memorial Teleforum in his honor.  The podcast features Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap (Professor of the Practice of Law Executive Director, Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, Duke University School of Law) and Prof. Michael A. Newton (Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School).

The law of war is of fundamental importance to the Armed Forces of the United States. The law of war is part of who we are.” So begins the new U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual, published last June, which had not been updated for nearly 60 years. At 1180 single-spaced pages and with 6,916 footnotes, the manual would seem to be thorough and exhaustive. Our experts will critique the Department of Defense Manual. Does it provide the guidance necessary to troops on the ground, commanders, and all actors in between? How does it address modern warfare, terrorism, and asymmetrical war? How does it define lawful and unlawful belligerents? What does it say about interrogation and detention? These and other questions were addressed by our experts.

It’s a wonderful way to remember a great guy, but continuing to discuss and debate those issues about which he cared the most.

Eichmann Called Himself an Instrument

by Jens David Ohlin

The New York Times reported yesterday that Adolf Eichmann apparently wrote, by hand, an 11th-hour request to the Israeli President for a pardon of his conviction for crimes against humanity (or commutation of his death sentence). The request was denied and Eichmann was executed a few days later–the only execution ever carried out by the Israeli criminal justice system. The letter had been filed in archives and was only recently rediscovered as papers were being prepared for digitization.

Eichmann’s arguments are disturbing. Here is an excerpt:

There is a need to draw a line between the leaders responsible and the people like me forced to serve as mere instruments in the hands of the leaders… I was not a responsible leader, and as such do not feel myself guilty.

What is striking about the letter, in addition to its obvious obliviousness to his own moral responsibility, is the invocation of the language of “instrumentalities” in the argument. The notion of an “instrument”–a human instrument, analogous to a weapon or other physical object–was incredibly important for Claus Roxin, the German criminal law theorist who used the Eichmann case as an inspiration for the development of his theory of indirect perpetration, called Organisationsherrschaft, which translated means roughly “indirect perpetration through an organized apparatus of power.”

For Roxin, Eichmann was a classic case of someone who used others as instruments to perpetrate his crimes. But instead of simply using other individuals, Eichmann used an organization–which was characterized by the fungibility of its members and the automaticity of its execution of orders received from above. In that sense, the organization became the “through element” by which the order was carried out and the criminal plan brought to fruition by Eichmann.

The ironic thing is that in Eichmann’s letter, he claims that he was the mere instrument–presumably an instrument in the hands of Hitler himself. Obviously the Israeli Court disagreed and viewed Eichmann as something more than a mere instrument–they concluded that he was an active participant and indeed architect of the specifics of the so-called “Final Solution,” the extermination of Jews in Germany, Europe, and beyond.

Although Eichmann’s factual argument is implausible and self-serving (and inconsistent with the facts), it does raise, in the abstract, a complex legal question: how to treat the responsibility of mid-level or upper-level perpetrators who control subordinates below them but who are arguably not at the top of the chain of command. Should Organisationsherrschaft (and the Control Theory more broadly) apply to them?  How should we model individual criminal responsibility in this context?

Incidentally, this issue is discussed by Kai Ambos in Volume 1 of his treatise, pages 115-116, especially with regard to a case in Argentina that declined to apply Organisationsherrschaft for similar reasons (the court concluded that it could only be applied to the top-level Junta, and not subordinate officers below the top level). I’m curious what others think of this argument.

The ICC and Mainstream TV: A Recent Episode of The Blacklist

by Kristen Boon

I was watching a recent episode of the TV show The Blacklist the other day, when much to my surprise there was a segment on the International Criminal Court.

As the summary recounts:  “The Director wakes up on the Venezuelan president’s jet, where Foreign Minister Diaz arrests him. Red calls Hitchin to say they’re on their way to the Hague, where The Director will be tried for crimes against humanity…”

On the one hand, there is an accurate back and forth about whether the ICC has jurisdiction over The Director, because the US is not a party to the ICC. (Venezeula, of course, is).

On the other hand, the writers glossed over the fact that “delivering” a high level US government official to the ICC’s front door does not equal a referral – the ICC has the power to determine whether its jurisdictional requirements are met under Arts. 12 & 13 of the Rome Statute.

The other creative fiction of the show is that the ICC has an ongoing investigation into US activities (drones, torture, and rendition).    In reality, the ICC has opened an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, which implicates the US.   It was first reported in the press two years ago.   The 2015 Report on OTP activities (at p. 31) indicates this investigation is still ongoing.  (Hat tip to Kevin Heller for confirming the current status of this probe).  Nonetheless, any ongoing ICC investigations are far narrower  than what the TV show suggests.

I confess to great satisfaction in watching the ICC enter popular culture, even if some creative liberties are being taken as to its jurisdiction and potential reach over American officials.

Spoiler alert: here is the relevant part of the script!

Red: Oh, your God can’t help you now, Peter. You’re traveling over the Atlantic, on the Venezuelan President’s Airbus, – on your way to The Hague.
The Director: You’re insane.
Red: I wouldn’t know. But you’re going to have the distinguished honor of becoming the first American official ever to be charged with even a single war crime, let alone the slew of them you will undoubtedly be accused of – before the week is out.
The Director: This won’t happen. United States isn’t party to the Rome Treaty. We don’t recognize its authority.
Diaz: But Venezuela does. And cases can be referred to the court by any country that is a signatory. You know as well as I do, even better given your position, the international court has been investigating the US government and the CIA for any number of alleged crimes. The drone program, the rendition of foreign citizens, torture as a means of interrogation.
Mr Diaz: The Chief Prosecutor has made it clear. He does not need American permission to move forward.
Red: He needs an American in the flesh. The court will not try anyone in absentia. So far, no country has had the courage to deliver one of your countrymen to the court until now. You’re a trendsetter, Peter. Who knew?
Director: I am the CIA Director of Clandestine Services. Do you have any idea what’s gonna happen to you? This is an act of war. My government will never let it stand.
Red: Precisely what I’m counting on.  …..

Red: Laurel, Raymond here. Here’s where we stand. In a handful of hours, this jet will land in Rotterdam, it will be met by the Dutch federal police, who will escort the Director to ‘S-Gravenhage, where the global spectacle of a high-ranking American official charged with war crimes will begin.

Guest Post: 2015 at the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights–A Year in Review

by Oliver Windridge

[Oliver Windridge is a British lawyer specializing in international human rights and international criminal law. Oliver is founder of The ACtHPR Monitor, an independent blog and website dedicated to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, on twitter @acthpr_monitor. In June 2014 he was one of five non-African lawyers to be appointed to the Court’s inaugural list of Legal Aid Counsel (pro bono). The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations or any other organization affiliated to the author.]

Following some positive feedback from last year’s post rounding up the activities of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 2014, I thought a review of some of the Court’s key 2015 events may be of interest.

For those who are not familiar with the Court, it was established by the African Union (AU) to hear cases relating to alleged violations of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) and other international human rights instruments. The Court is based in Arusha, Tanzania and is separate to its cousin the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights. Two key instruments to keep in mind are the Court’s Protocol, ratification of which gives the Court jurisdiction to hear cases referred to it by the African Commission, from the country itself, from other AU members states and from African Intergovernmental Organizations. The other instrument is the “Special Declaration”, found in Article 5 (3) and Article 34 (6) of the Protocol, which must be signed by the member state in addition to the Protocol to allow individuals and NGOs from that member state to petition the Court directly.

May: the Court’s 37th Ordinary Session

At its 37th Ordinary Session the Court held public hearings in two cases concerning Tanzania. In Onyango et al v Tanzania the Applicants, all citizens of Kenya, allege they were kidnapped in Mozambique and taken to Tanzania where they were charged with murder and three charges of armed robbery. In Abubakari v Tanzania, the Applicant challenges a conviction and 30 year sentence for two counts of armed robbery. Judgement in both cases is pending.

June: Zongo and others v Burkina Faso reparations judgement

Having handed down judgment on the merits in March 2014 in Zongo and others v Burkina Faso, in which the Court found that with regards to the alleged assassination of investigative journalist Norbert Zongo and colleagues in December 1998, Burkina Faso violated several articles of the African Charter and Article 66 of the ECOWAS Treaty by failing to take measures to ensure the families of the deceased the right to be heard by a competent national court, the Court handed down its judgement on reparations. This judgement is the first in which the Court has awarded reparations to successful applicants. The judgement solidified the Court’s initial findings in June 2014 in the Mtikila v Tanzania reparations judgement that the Court has the power to award reparations to the victims of human rights violations. Zongo builds on this by actually doing so. In fact, the Court awarded the entire amount claimed in reparations by the applicants who consisted of the spouses, children and parents of the deceased. The Court also awarded a symbolic payment to the NGO who assisted in bringing the case and ordered costs for lawyer’s fees, travel and accommodation. As I have written elsewhere, the award of reparation should cement Zongo and others v Burkina Faso as another landmark case for the Court.

July: sensitization visit to Lesotho

In July, the Court conducted a one-day sensitization visit to Lesotho. The main objective of sensitization visits being to enhance the protection of human rights in Africa and promote the Court and its activities. As the Court’s press release explained, Court officials met with various government officials, lawyers and NGOs. The visit saw further promises from both government and the NGO sector to work toward signing the Court’s Special Declaration that would individuals and NGOs in Lesotho direct access to the Court.

July: the EACJ ruled on the Court’s Special Declaration

In Democratic Party v Secretary General of the East African Community and others the Appellate Division of the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) ruled on whether signing the Court’s Protocol also creates an obligation on the member state to sign the Special Declaration. The EACJ Appellate Division found that whilst it was able to consider potential violations of the African Charter and the Court’s Protocol under the premise of the East African Community Treaty, the wording of Article 5 (3) and Article 34 (6) of the Protocol contained no requirement that a member state who signs the Protocol must also sign the Special Declaration. This important decision seems to preclude, at least for now, reading any obligations into signing the Protocol that are not clearly spelled out, and keeps the process for granting individuals and NGOs access to the Court a definite two stage process.

August: Cameroon ratifies the Court’s Protocol

In August, Cameroon ratified the Court’s Protocol, taking the number of AU member states who have ratified to 29. Still, only seven AU member states have signed the additional Special Declaration. The AU has a total of 54 members.

September: (Then) President Kikwete visits the Court

Tanzanian President Kikwete, as he was prior to Tanzania’s elections, visited the Court in September. During this visit Kikwete announced that Tanzania was pledging $100,000 towards the Court’s legal aid scheme, which was set up in July 2014. Sadly, some 14 months after the fund’s creation, Tanzania’s pledge appears to be the first and only such donation to the legal aid scheme to date.

October: sensitization visit to South Africa

The Court held a one-day sensitization event in South Africa, including an address by the Court’s President Justice Ramadhani encouraging South Africa, which ratified the Court’s protocol some 13 years ago, to make the Special Declaration. More information on the visit can be seen here and here.

November: 39th Ordinary Session

The Court rendered its judgement on the merits in Thomas v Tanzania at its 39th Ordinary Session, marking another success for an applicant before the Court, this time relating to fair trial rights.

The Applicant was convicted in Tanzania of armed robbery and sentenced to thirty years imprisonment, a sentence he was serving at the time of the application. The Court found that the trial process leading to the Applicant’s conviction and his subsequent attempts to appeal said conviction were riddled with violations of his right to a fair trial. In particular, the Court found Tanzania in violation of Articles 1, 7(1) (a) (The right to an appeal to competent national organs) , (c) (the right to a defence and counsel of choice), and (d) (The right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal) of the African Charter as well as Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR. However, despite finding these violations, the Court rejected his request for immediate release from prison, since he had not set out “specific or compelling circumstances”. Instead, it called on Tanzania to remedy the violations within six months, specifically precluding retrial or the reopening of the defence case as remedies, given that the Applicant had served 20 out of 30 years in prison; surely an indirect call by the Court for the Applicant to be released. Issues of costs and reparations have been postponed to a later date.

November: 2nd Judicial Dialogue

The Court jointly organized with the AU the second “Continental Judicial Dialogue” which took place in Arusha. The event included delegates from AU member states, including Chief Justices, Presidents of Supreme Courts and Constitutional Courts, members of academia, national judiciaries and media. The theme of the three day event was “Connecting National and International Justice”. Interestingly, amongst the attendees were a number of judge from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights who shared their experiences of sitting on human rights cases.

December: sensitization visit to Chad and the results of the Court’s inaugural moot court competition

The Court undertook its third sensitization visit of the year to Chad. From this visit, we received the encouraging promise that Chad will sign the Court’s Protocol and, crucially for access issues, the Special Declaration. Although at the time of writing this has not yet happened, the public declaration will hopefully serve to see Chad go on to fulfil its promise sooner rather than later.

Finally, the Court announced the winners of its inaugural moot court competition, with Moi University in first place, the University of Zambia a close second and Makerere University third.

Conclusion

The Court continued to promote itself with sensizitation visits AU to Leshoto, South Africa and Chad, with this last visit resulting in the promise that Chad will sign the Court’s Protocol and Special Declaration imminently. Whilst there were also rumblings in Uganda about signing the Special Declaration, it is worth noting that no AU member state actually signed the Special Declaration in 2015, meaning further engagement with member states is clearly needed. On actual cases before the Court, applicants continue have a 100% success rate, having now gone a perfect 4-for-4 before the Court, showing that when jurisdictional issues are overcome the Court is not afraid to make findings against member states.

Above all, 2015 felt like a year in which the Court continued to mature and begin to seriously promote itself across Africa. The President of Court himself has been vocal in urging AU members states to sign the Protocol and Special Declaration allowing individuals and NGOs direct access to the Court as can be seen here, here, here, and here. Of course, what continues to hamper the Court is the number of individuals and NGOs who can actually access the Court. To make the Court a truly continental one, AU member states must sign up and embrace the Court in 2016 and beyond.

Parsing the Syrian-Russian Agreement Concerning Russia’s Deployment

by Chris Borgen

The Washington Post asks (and answers) the following:

When you are a major nuclear power and you want to make a secretive deployment to a faraway ally, what is the first thing you do? Draw up the terms, apparently, and sign a contract.

That’s what the Kremlin did with Syria in August, according to an unusual document posted this week on a Russian government website that details the terms of its aerial support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Among other revelations in the seven-page contract dated Aug. 26, 2015, the Kremlin has made an open-ended time commitment to its military deployment in Syria, and either side can terminate it with a year’s notice.

The “Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic on deployment of an aviation group of the Russian Armed Forces on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic” is similar in purpose to status of forces agreements (SOFAs) that the U.S. signs with countries in which it has military bases. (For an overview of US SOFA practice, see this State Department document (.pdf). ) The agreement sets out issues concerning immunities, transit rights, the movement of property, and so forth.

However, every international agreement is a product of the political and strategic concerns in a particular bilateral relationship. Consequently, there can be a variety of SOFA practice even among the agreements drafted by a single country.  Concerning US practice, GlobalSecurity.org explains:

Status-of-forces agreements generally come in three forms. These include administrative and technical staff status under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Privileges, commonly referred to as A and T status; a “mini” status-of-forces agreement, often used for a short-term presence, such as an exercise; and a full-blown, permanent status-of-forces agreement. The appropriate arrangement is dependent upon the nature and duration of U.S. military activity within the host country, the maturity of our relationship with that country, and the prevailing political situation in the host nation.

To take one example from US practice, the 2008 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq (the “2008 Iraq SOFA” (.pdf))  was made after the US was already in Iraq for five years; it was in part about responding to tensions between the Iraqi government and the US as well as the mechanics of withdrawal. By contrast, the Russian/Syrian agreement was made early in an intervention of undefined length and scope. responding to issues that already existed, the 2008 Iraq SOFA is twenty-four pages long, covering more topics and also with more provisions within each article. (The 2008 Iraqi SOFA is no longer in force, but I will use it as a comparator.)

By contrast, the Russian/Syrian agreement is a very brief seven pages. But, besides being quite short, the main characteristic of the agreement is that it maximizes Russian prerogatives and flexibility. Article 2 has the transfer “without charge” from Syria to Russia of  “Hmeimim airbase in Latakia province, with its infrastructure, as well as the required territory agreed upon between the parties” for the use of the Russian aviation group to be deployed in Syria.  Article 5 entitles Russia: (more…)

Weekly News Wrap: Monday, January 18, 2016

by Jessica Dorsey

Here’s your weekly selection of international law and international relations headlines from around the world:

Africa

  • Burkina Faso and Mali have agreed to work together to counter the growing threat of Islamic militants in West Africa by sharing intelligence and conducting joint security patrols following two deadly and well-coordinated attacks in the region.
  • The UN says the worst drought in 30 years in Ethiopia means 400,000 children are suffering from severe acute malnutrition and more than 10 million people need food aid.
  • Somalia received a pledge of aid for $50 million from Saudi Arabia this month on the same day it announced it was cutting ties with Saudi rival Iran, a document seen by Reuters showed.

Middle East and Northern Africa

  • At least 42 people have been killed, including civilians, in suspected Russian air strikes in Syria’s Raqqa province, activists and a monitoring group say.
  • Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani has described as “historic” and a “great victory” the lifting of sanctions against Iran, declaring that the country is now reopening its doors to the international economy.
  • Islamic State militants kidnapped at least 400 civilians when they attacked government-held areas in the eastern Syrian city of Deir al-Zor on Saturday, a monitoring group said.

Asia

Europe

Americas

  • US president Barack Obama is expected to release a new plan in a bid to convince Congress to close Guantanamo Bay prison.
  • Two Swedish citizens whom U.S. prosecutors said fought alongside the Islamist militant group al Shabaab in Somalia in battles to take control of the country’s capital of Mogadishu were sentenced to 11 years in prison on Friday.

Oceania

UN/World

Gaza Flotilla Activists’ Lawsuit Against Israel Will Probably Fail for Lack of U.S. Jurisdiction (Updated)

by Julian Ku

[Please see the update below] Three U.S. citizens, and one Belgian national, have filed a civil lawsuit in U.S. District Court in Washington D.C. against the State of Israel alleging various injuries and damages suffered during an Israeli commando raid on their U.S.-registered ship.  The plaintiffs were activists who were sailing their vessel in support of the Palestinians on the Gaza Strip suffering under what the plaintiffs allege is an Israeli blockade. I don’t have a copy of the complaint, but according to this Washington Post report, there are a couple of pretty big legal obstacles for the plaintiffs to overcome.

“The attack on the high seas was unjustified and illegal under international law,” lawyer Steven M. Schneebaum of Washington wrote in a 21-page complaint, which alleged that the military operations injured more than 150 protesters and included torture, cruel or degrading treatment, arbitrary arrest and assault.

The first problem for the plaintiffs will be overcoming the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which bars U.S. courts from hearing cases against foreign sovereigns like Israel unless certain exceptions apply.  I can’t tell exactly from the report which exception the plaintiffs are trying to invoke, but the allegations of “torture, cruel and degrading treatment” etc. suggests the complaint is trying to allege such an egregious violation of international law that any defense of immunity will be deemed to have been “waived” by Israel.   I am highly doubtful that this argument will succeed, and indeed, I am fairly sure it is foreclosed by precedents in the D.C. Circuit (and elsewhere).

It is possible that the plaintiffs will seek to get jurisdiction under the “state-sponsored terrorism” exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1).  This might seem to apply, if we accept the plaintiffs’ claims as true, except that Israel would also have be designated by the U.S. government as a “state sponsor” of terrorism in order for the exception to apply.   Israel, needless to say, has not been so designated by the U.S. government, so this exception doesn’t work for the plaintiffs either.

It also appears the plaintiffs may have a statute of limitations problem as well, but I am not sure.  Also, was that ship U.S.-registered? If so, which tort law would apply? Or is it a claim under international law?

So I am pretty doubtful that this lawsuit will survive a motion by Israel to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.   Indeed, I wonder at its even being filed, given the jurisdictional problems it faces.  But perhaps I am missing something, and if so, feel free to let me know in the comments.

[Update: Jordan Paust and Ted Folkman point out in the comments that the plaintiffs are probably invoking either the “international agreements” exception in the FSIA or the “noncommercial tort” exception in 28 USC § 1605(a)(5), which allows an exception to immunity for claims “in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state…”

These are a much more plausible claims, and they depends (as Ted points out) on the idea that the raid on the US-flagged vessel means that the alleged tort occurred “in the United States.”   The leading decision is Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, which involved an Argentine missile strike on a Liberian-flagged ship owned by U.S. interests. That case held though that the “high seas” is not “in the United States” for purposes of the FSIA.  The only variation on this point I can see is that that the attack occurred on a U.S.-flagged vessel, as opposed to the “high seas.” I doubt this will fly, but I suppose it is worth a shot if I were the plaintiffs.]  

Autonomous Legal Reasoning: Legal and Ethical Issues in the Technologies of Conflict

by Duncan Hollis

One of the highlights of my Fall semester was the opportunity to host a one-day workshop at Temple Law on how autonomous technology may impact the future of international humanitarian law (IHL) and the lawyers who practice it.  With co-sponsorship from the International Committee of the Red Cross (specifically, Rob Ramey and Tracey Begley) as well as Gary Brown of Marine Corps University, we wanted to have an inter-disciplinary conversation on the way autonomy may implicate the practice of law across a range of new technologies, including cyberwar, drones, and the potential for fully autonomous lethal weapons.  Although these technologies share common characteristics — most notably their ability (and sometimes their need) to operate in the absence of direct human control — discursive silos have emerged where these technologies tend to be discussed in isolation.

Our workshop sought to bridge this divide by including experts on all three technologies from an array of disciplinary backgrounds, including IHL, political science, and ethics (see here for a list of participants).  Fortunately, the day itself lived up to the hype, with a detailed agenda that prompted a wide-ranging set of conversations on the nature of the technology, the ethical issues, as well as IHL’s current regulations and its likely future evolution.  Subject to the Chatham House Rule, the ICRC has published summaries of these conversations on their blog, Intercross.

In addition to those blog posts, the Temple International and Comparative Law Journal will publish a series of short (and often provocative) think-pieces written for the workshop.  My own contribution, Setting the Stage: Autonomous Legal Reasoning in International Humanitarian Law is now available on SSRN.  Here’s the abstract:

This short essay seeks to reorient — and broaden — the existing discourse on international humanitarian law (IHL) and autonomous weapons. Written for a conference co-sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross, it employs a contextual analysis to pose new questions (and reformulate others) regarding the relationship between IHL and autonomous weapon systems. It asks six questions: (1) Who should IHL regulate in this context? Does IHL only regulate States and individuals, or can it provide rules for autonomous weapon systems themselves? (2) What types of autonomous technology should IHL regulate? Should the current focus on kinetic weapons expand to encompass cyber operations? (3) Where should this discourse occur? How do the trade-offs involved in locating legal discourse in a particular forum impact the elaboration of IHL vis-à-vis autonomous systems? (4) When should IHL regulate autonomous weapons? Should IHL ban autonomous weapons now or allow its regulation to emerge incrementally over time? Can IHL only apply when an autonomous system’s operations constitute an attack, or should IHL’s application reach more broadly? (5) How should IHL regulate autonomous weapon systems? Are prohibitions better or worse than prescriptive authorities? Should IHL regulate via rules, standards, or principles? Finally, (6) why should IHL regulate autonomous weapons? How can IHL best prioritize among its foundations in military necessity, humanitarian values, and the practical reality that the development of such systems now appears inevitable. In asking these questions, my essay offers a critical lens for gauging the current scope (and state) of international legal discourse on this topic. In doing so, it sets the stage for new lines of inquiry that States and other stakeholders will need to address to fully understand the perils — and potential — of increasing autonomy in technology for IHL and the international lawyers who practice it.

Fans of Thomas Aquinas may be particularly interested in this piece since I ask these questions using the same analytical frame Aquinas deployed to delineate those circumstances that define human acts.  Otherwise, interested readers should keep an eye out for the Symposium volume itself, which should be out sometime later this Spring or early this coming Summer.

 

Guest Post: Merry-Go-Round Justice–The Retrial of Stanišić and Simatović

by Wayne Jordash

[Wayne Jordash , QC, is a Managing Partner of Global Rights Compliance LLP and a barrister at Doughty Street Chambers. He served as counsel for Jovica Stanišić in the proceedings described in this post and has been temporarily assigned for the new proceedings.]

On the 15 December 2015, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) Appeals Chamber ordered a retrial of Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović. The Appeals Chamber granted the Prosecution’s request that the decision to acquit be quashed because the Trial Chamber’s approach to joint criminal enterprise (“JCE”) and aiding and abetting were deficient. The retrial will take place under ICTY’s successor, the United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (“MICT”).

Before launching headlong into a discussion on the merits of the decision to order a retrial, it is worthwhile noting that intelligent minds often reasonably disagree on complex ICTY appellate issues. As the ICTY has learnt to its chagrin over the last few years, this is the nature of appeals and sometimes the storms must just be weathered. That said, in the final analysis, some minds might turn out to be more reasonable than others and the quality of the reasoning is as good as signpost as any of the true merits and bona fides of a decision and the prospects of it contributing to our understanding of the law. Accordingly, in the circumstances of the Stanišić and Simatović appeal, it is worthwhile beginning any discussion concerning the merits of the order for retrial with a discussion of the merits and reasoning of the substantive aspects of the appeal. It is instructive to contrast the arguable before moving to the indefensible.

First, for the JCE ground, the Majority of the Appeals Chamber concluded that the Majority in the Trial Chamber had made an error in the course of finding that Mr. Stanišić had not intended to pursue any criminal purpose. They argued that the Trial Chamber should have first considered whether the Serbian leadership had a plan to commit crimes in Croatia and Bosnia, what the scope of that plan was, who was involved and whether Mr. Stanišić’s acts contributed to the plan. They concluded that it was only by first reaching these definitive conclusions about the alleged criminal plan could Mr. Stanišić’s JCE intent be properly adjudicated. At first glance, this approach surely has a superficial attractiveness that warrants further consideration.

However, a closer examination of the underlying premise of this ground reminds us that all that glitters is not gold. The reasoning of the Appeals Chamber appears to suggest that it is not possible for a Trial Chamber to take a holistic view of the evidence and recognise an accused’s consistent avoidance of crime in order to reach a conclusion that the accused did not make a significant contribution to any criminal plan and had no criminal intent. Instead, it seems, the Trial Chamber should painstakingly describe the criminal plan in all its florid detail – even though they are convinced from an examination of the accused’s established conduct that he was consistently engaged in conduct that did not advance or further crime.

Logic suggests that if Mr. Stanišić was alleged to have taken part in a robbery of a bank, a trier of fact would be well-equipped to acquit on the basis that he established a solid alibi that showed he was elsewhere, involved in lawful activity and made no contribution to the specific acts alleged to be within the robbers’ plan. On the Majority view in the Stanišić appeal, it was impossible to be satisfied that Stanišić was acting lawfully without describing all of the robbery, even though he was not there, did not contribute to any aspect of it and was shown to be contemporaneously pursuing legitimate purposes.

The fact that the Majority in the Appeals Chamber eschews this type of analytical discussion in favour of bald assertions that JCE intent may only be inferred through a rigidly linear, calculative approach tells us something about the merits of the conclusion, even if reasonable minds could agree or disagree about some of the arguable points. As does the fact, as pointed out by Judge Afanđe in his eloquent dissent, that such an approach is a departure from previous analytical frameworks employed in cases such as Popović, Pandurević, Milutinović and others and Prlić and others. Whichever way it is spun, and however arguable the issues are, it does seem a little late in the day to be overturning acquittals on the basis that unbeknownst there is only one way to assess JCE intent.

Moreover, the trenchant critique of their fellow judges, Judge Agius and Judge Alfanđe, tells us how the Majority got to where they wanted to go and why there may be little that resembles adequate explanation or express reasoning. As stated by Judge Agius:

[i]t is unfortunate that the Majority’s approach contains a number of shortcomings. Not only is it difficult to identify and understand the Majority’s reasons from the text of Judgment, but in its limited discussion, I respectfully submit that the Majority: (i) misstates the applicable law; (ii) fails to reconcile its analysis, in any meaningful fashion with the learned submissions advanced by counsel for the parties; and (iii) takes the practice of the Appeals Chamber dramatically out of context when applying it to the circumstances of this case.

He finds the “lack of transparency” in the Majority’s approach “particularly troubling, in light of its own obligation to provide a reasoned judgment in writing.” That irony was also not lost on Judge Afanđe, who, whilst discussing the flaws in the Majority’s approach, mused on the Majority criticising the Trial Chamber for failing to provide adequate reasoning for its decisions while doing precisely the same thing: a classic case of kettle calling the pot.

Considering the other aspect of the substantive merits, the decision to reverse the acquittals rested on the Trial Chamber’s analysis of Stanišić’s mens rea that was arguably assessed through the lens of the much-debated ‘specific direction’ requirement. Even if one can once again bemoan the lack of reasoning and legal engagement, as with the JCE ground, one can at least see how the Majority of the Appeals Chamber got to where it wanted to go, even if reasonable minds might have queried whether in the particular analytical circumstances the application of specific direction had any meaningful impact on Stanišić’s aiding and abetting acquittals. Nonetheless, as many stakeholders in the international criminal process learn to their cost, this is sometimes the way the die is cast: discretion is discretion and that is the day-to-day business of criminal courts. (more…)

UGA Invites Applications for New Chair in International Law

by Peter Spiro

This from friend of OJ Harlan Cohen. The chair is in honor of Gabe Wilner, a longtime professor of international law at UGA.

The University of Georgia School of Law invites applications for a fully endowed professorship in international law beginning August of 2016. Applicants should be able to join the faculty at the rank of full professor. They should have a J.D. from an accredited university or its foreign equivalent, superior academic credentials and demonstrated excellence in scholarship and teaching. Applications received by February 1, 2016 are assured of consideration. All interested persons should submit a curriculum vitae, including scholarly publications, with a letter of interest at http://facultyjobs.uga.edu/postings/527

The University of Georgia is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action employer. All qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or protected veteran status.