International Human Rights Law

As I recently noted, the Appeals Chamber has rejected Libya's request to suspend its obligation to surrender Saif Gaddafi to the ICC pending resolution of its admissibility appeal. Libya, of course, has no intention of complying with that obligation. Indeed, it admitted as much today: According to Libya’s Justice Minister Salah al-Marghani, Seif, who is being detained in the Libyan city...

Peter has responded at Lawfare to my most recent post. I think we've taken the argument about as far as we can, so I'll give Peter the last word. Suffice it to say that, according to Peter's new post, there is nothing wrong with an appellate court upholding a defendant's conviction (1) for a non-existent war crime -- conspiracy; (2)...

As I was doing some research for my posts on the al-Bahlul amicus brief, I came across a superb student note in the Michigan Journal of International Law written by Alexandra Link. It's entitled "Trying Terrorism: Material Support for Terrorism, Joint Criminal Enterprise, and the Paradox of International Criminal Law," and here is the (very long) abstract: In 2003, the United States...

I noted in the update to my response to Margulies that the Hamdan military commission rejected the government's argument that JCE is a viable alternative to conspiracy as an inchoate crime. It's worth adding that the Khadr military commission rejected the same argument. A brief filed by Khadr provides the necessary background (pp. 2-3; emphasis mine): On 2 February 2007, the Office...

[David J. R. Frakt, Lt. Col., USAFR, is a legal scholar and former lead counsel, Office of Military Commissions-Defense.] I write in response to the amicus brief submitted by “former government officials, military lawyers, and scholars of national security law” including my good friends Peter Margulies, Eric Jensen and several other esteemed and highly accomplished colleagues, discussed in Kevin Jon Heller’s excellent...

Here is a paragraph you don't often see in the mainstream American media: The conviction of Manning, in other words, would also be a conviction of Bill Keller. Most importantly, if Manning is found guilty on the charge of aiding the enemy, it would strike a deep blow at the stated reason for the New York Times' existence. From the beginning,...

On page 23, the amicus brief concludes that al-Bahlul's "convictions should be affirmed." Presumably, that means the brief is asking for the DC Circuit to affirm al-Bahlul's conviction for conspiracy as an inchoate offence -- that was the charge on the charge sheet, and that is the charge that was upheld by the military commission in its findings. (The other convictions were...

Outside of Kigali, no one really doubts that the Rwandan government and military have financed, supplied, and at times even directed M23's actions in the DRC. But it's still nice to see the US government acknowledging that fact: It is the first response by Washington to recent M23 clashes with Congolese government forces near Goma, the largest city in the DRC's...

[Solon Solomon will join King’s College of London, Dickson Poon School of Law as of September 2013, and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto is a Faculty member of the University of Manchester, School of Law.] Much has already been written on the Comoros referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in light of the Mavi Marmara incident (EJIL:Talk!, Opinio Juris, Human Rights Blog and Dov Jacobs Blog). The referral while premised on a legal footing arguably has a second facet which is significant—political. It is as been noted elsewhere (EJIL:Talk!) that this was the first case where an African state referred a non-African state to the Court. The political parameter aside, the Comoros referral introduces two important doctrinal issues which pervade the discussions of this referral. These are article 12(2) of the Rome Statute regarding vessel jurisdiction and the legal discourse around the axiom that all State Parties can refer to the Court possible crimes perpetrated on the territory of a State Party. The authors’ assertion is that the two spectra have wider implications for future cases and thus their elaboration is essential in the realm of the Prosecutor’s response to the Comoros referral. As far as jurisdiction is concerned, we add our voice to authors who have so far who have held this is asserted. (See EJIL:Talk!, Opinio Juris and Human Rights Blog-spot) In this particular piece we would like to argue that such an assertion is de lege lata and not necessarily the case de lege ferenda. The assertion of jurisdiction derives from article 12(2)’s grammatical reading. However it is imperative to bear in mind that since the Rome Statute is a negotiated treaty, it is subject to wider reflection other than the narrow confines of the black letter provision. In this regard we aver that as a treaty, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is at play and in this regard invite consideration that the treaty provisions as provided for in the VCLT should be read in their contextual and historical depth, including their negotiation history and the volition of the parties. As such, there are elements that accompany the Rome Statute provisions on vessel jurisdiction which while not embedded in the wording of the provision itself, still constitute part of its essence. The Rome Statute provision was drafted along the lines of article 91 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The latter, echoing a strong jurisprudence and treaty tradition stipulates and favours the notion that there must be a genuine link between the flag state and the vessel. This genuine link requirement is critical. While in some instances judicial bodies may have appeared reluctant to assert it, the reason was not its denial, but judicial and academic fears that a strict diligence to the principle would eventually preclude the forging of any nationality bonds, a far worse scenario. In the MV “Saiga” (No.2) case, the International Tribunal on Law of the Sea expressly stated that the role of the genuine link requirement is to secure more effective implementation of the duties of the flag state. UNCLOS does not envision an arrangement where states just confer nationality to ships and then are not at all engaged in their activities. Nationality is regarded as having a functional character. States try to protect social bonds of attachment against mere formal nationality imposed by the technicalities of law. This functional inquisition is evident in diverse fora. For example in the case of UN sanctions, such as those against Serbia and Iran, the relevant Security Council Resolutions considered the nationality of the vessel based on ownership or contract terms, regardless of the flag under which the ship may sail. (see UN SC Res 787 (1992) and UN SC Res 1929 (2010)). Essentially then, Article 91(1) of UNCLOS should be read in conjunction with article 94, in a way that the exercise of effective jurisdiction over the vessel constitutes one of the necessary conditions for granting nationality. It is thus too long a legal bow to draw that with embryonic jurisprudence on the subject, the ICC will have in mind previous positions and thus reflect on its article 12(2) vessel jurisdiction as not only encapsulating the straight line reading on flag jurisdiction but also the matter of a genuine link with the vessel particularly given the nature of its mandate. In the case of Comoros, the Mavi Marmara was Comoros flagged just a week before the flotilla incident.

As I was checking my news feeds on Google News, I came across this: The snail photo is not actually part of the Washington Post article. So does that mean Google shares my concern with Libya's endless stall tactics?...