I have just returned from teaching international humanitarian law in Nairobi. Two al-Shabaab grenade attacks not far from my hotel notwithstanding, it was one of the greatest professional experiences of my life. The training was organized by the Brussels-based International Association of Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection (PHAP), in conjunction with the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict...
Ruti Teitel’s new book, Humanity’s Law, is an ambitious effort to make sense of the international legal landscape of our post-Cold War, post-9/11 world. Rejecting formalist distinctions between legal paradigms, she sketches out a bold synthesis of recent legal trends away from a state-centered understanding of international law and toward an international legal order in which individuals are the key...
I have posted a substantially revised version of my essay "A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity" on SSRN. The essay is appearing in two different forms. The long version (23,000 words) -- the one I've posted -- is forthcoming in Volume 53 of the Harvard International Law Journal. The short version (7,000 words), which focuses on the new theory of complementarity...
As Roger has pointed out, the Ninth Circuit has just released a blockbuster ATS decision in the Rio Tinto case. There is a great deal to like in the decision, particularly concerning the liability of corporations under the ATS, but it's regrettable that the majority refused to address the knowledge/intent "debate" concerning the mens rea of aid and abetting under...
In my previous post, I responded to Mike's attempt to explain the amicus brief's distortion of ICTY jurisprudence. In this post, I want to respond to his similar attempt to explain the amicus brief's distortion of the Rome Statute. There are two basic issues: Article 10 of the Rome Statute's relationship to customary international law, and the importance of Article...
There are numerous problems with Mike's response to my posts (here and here) about how the amicus brief distorts the ICTY's jurisprudence. Before getting to them, though, it's important to acknowledge that he and I agree about one thing: decisions of the ICTY are not primary sources of international law. That, too, is international law 101. Even here, though, the...
I appreciate Mike taking the time to respond. I'll address his various criticisms in separate posts; here I want to focus on the amicus brief's claim (p. 14) that Sosa requires a norm applies in ATS litigation only if it has "undisputed international acceptance," a standard that is satisfied only if (p. 7) "the defendant’s alleged conduct [is] universally recognized...
Revisiting the Peace-Justice Debate in northern Uganda
Perhaps no nation has witnessed so impassioned a debate on the relationship between peace and international criminal justice as Uganda. Northern Uganda, a case many believed the Court could “cut its teeth” on, sparked a fierce discussion, popularly referred to as the “peace versus justice debate”. This debate not only animated domestic politics but also the international discourse grappling with the effects of pursuing international criminal justice on the establishment of peace. The debate on the relationship between peace and justice largely remains harshly dichotomous and black-and-white. Either international criminal justice fundamentally disrupts the potential for creating peace or it is an absolute necessity for it. The attempted middle-ground which calls the peace-justice dichotomy “false” rarely offers any explanation as to why it's false. Northern Uganda may be our best opportunity to move beyond the rigidity of the peace versus justice debate. This post is an attempt to explain why this is the case by making two broad arguments: first, that the effects of the ICC on narratives regarding the dynamics and causes of conflict has profound implications on attitudes towards the relationship between peace and justice; and second, that the effects of the ICC on pre-negotiation dynamics as well as on negotiations themselves are distinct and should be analyzed as such.The brief says this with regard to the mens rea of aiding and abetting (knowledge) in Furundzija and Vasiljevic (pp. 10-11): Further, it may be questioned whether the mens rea discussion in these opinions was necessary to their holdings. Liability in those cases likely could have been premised on co-participation in a joint criminal enterprise (such as a rogue paramilitary unit),...
The brief claims the following (p. 11): Moreover, even the ICTY jurisprudence has not settled on a mens rea standard for accessorial liability. Although the Furundzija decision expressly adopts a “knowledge” standard, a subsequent decision, Vasiljevic, requires that the aider and abettor’s act be “specifically directed to assist ...
I've already said pretty much everything I have to say about the mistaken idea that intent is the customary mens rea of aiding and abetting (see here and here), so there is no reason to spend much time addressing the amicus brief Julian mentions. I simply want to note that the brief's reliance on the Rome Statute for the intent...
As readers know, a few of us on the blog have been debating whether the law of neutrality has any relevance to the United States' conflict with al-Qaeda. I'm thus delighted to announce that three essays on that very issue are now available on SSRN as part of a mini-symposium hosted by the Texas International Law Journal. The lead essay...
