International Criminal Law

At his new blog, Derek Gregory posts the following photo, which shows American soldiers applying the "water cure" during the war in the Phillippines, which lasted from 1899-1902: Of course, not everything old is new again.  Five Army officers were convicted by courts-martial for using the "water cure" during the Phillippine War, with one reviewing authority unequivocally describing the interrogation method...

[Jean Galbraith is Assistant Professor at Rutgers-Camden School of Law] This post is part of the Leiden Journal of International Law Vol 25-3 symposium. Other posts in this series can be found in the related posts below.
I want to thank Opinio Juris and the Leiden Journal of International Law for putting together this symposium.  I am especially grateful to Professor Dov Jacobs for organizing this session and to Professors Mark Drumbl and Meg deGuzman for their thoughtful comments about my article. Some years back, I noticed how frequently international criminal defendants argued that they deserved credit for help they had given members of the other side during the conflict.  Almost every ICTR defendant claimed that he had helped protect one or more Tutsis, and ICTY defendants asserted all manner of humanitarian acts.  Most of these claims seemed dubious in their veracity or trivial relative to the defendants’ crimes, but a few left me wondering whether those defendants really belonged among the worst of the worst.  These observations led to this article, which has both a structural and a substantive component. Structurally, I look at how the ICTY and ICTR have dealt with evidence of frequent use of defendants’ “good deeds” in sentencing.  The tribunals have dealt with this evidence in ad hoc fashion, with trial chambers taking a variety of cursory approaches and with little guidance from the Appeals Chamber.  This in and of itself is suggestive of how international criminal tribunals allocate their efforts.  Where inconsistencies in substantive international criminal law tend to get thoroughly examined and resolved, other kinds of issues – especially in sentencing – often slip through the cracks.  This may be especially true of issues that are, as Professor Drumbl puts it, sui generis to international criminal law:  it is harder for courts to recognize these as systematic issues in the first place. Substantively, I consider how defendants’ good deeds should affect the sentences they receive.  This is a hard question.  There’s no consensus among domestic jurisdictions about how much or how little to weigh good acts at sentencing.  When confronted with conflicting domestic approaches, the ICTY and ICTR have often focused on picking among them.  I argue, however, that the tribunals can avoid doing so here and instead derive their approach from the unique features of international criminal law.  Specifically, I argue that, as a doctrinal or functional matter, international crimes typically arise out of conflicts between groups -- and are considered to be international crimes worthy of the attention of the international community in part because of this quality.  Because of this, I suggest that good deeds by defendants aimed at those on the other side of the conflict should mitigate in part (though only in part) the appropriate level of retribution at sentencing, with the degree of mitigation to depend on the relative magnitude of the defendant’s crimes and good deeds.  I also argue that, depending on motive, a defendant’s good deeds might also serve as evidence of rehabilitable character. Professors Drumbl and deGuzman direct most of their comments to my substantive argument.  Professor deGuzman questions my overall emphasis on retributivist reasoning and also notes concerns about some particular points.  Professor Drumbl is sympathetic to my overall argument but urges me to revisit or expand my argument on five specific issues.  I can’t do full justice to their points, which reflect careful scholarly engagement with my article, but here are some brief responses.

Julian beat me to Eric Posner's new Slate article on the legality of drone strikes.  I don't agree with everything in it, but I think it's notable that Posner -- echoing his sometime co-author Jack Goldsmith -- rejects the idea that international law permits self-defense against a non-state actor whenever a state is "unable or unwilling" to prevent the NSA...

I'm currently writing an article for the Journal of International Criminal Justice on the legality of signature drone strikes under international humanitarian law and international human rights law.  I will link to the article when it's done (two weeks or so), but I couldn't resist posting the following quotes -- the first from the New York Times, describing the Obama...

Since June 2012, there has been a new addition to the international legal blogosphere: Armed Groups and International Law. The blog is edited by Katharine Fortin of Utrecht University and Rogier Bartels at the Netherlands Defence Academy and the University of Amsterdam. The blog's two main purposes are information sharing and community building between individuals and organizations working on issues related to armed groups....

Benjamin Netanyahu is being suitably mocked for the Wily E. Coyote-like picture of a bomb he used at the UN to describe Israel's "red line" concerning Iran's purported efforts to build a nuclear weapon.  There's no need for me to pile on; even right-wingers are horrified, with Jeffrey Goldberg -- Jeffrey Goldberg! -- tweeting earlier today that "Netanyahu's bomb cartoon...

[Polina Levina is a masters in international law candidate at the School of Oriental and African Studies and Kaveri Vaid is an Institute for International Law and Justice Scholar at New York University School of Law.] Overview Recently, Human Rights Watch released a report detailing systematic practices of capture, torture, and rendition of members of the Libyan opposition by the United States Central Intelligence Agency.  At least...

[Dr. Chantal Meloni works at the University of Milan and is a von Humboldt scholar in Berlin. She is the co-editor of Is there a Court for Gaza?, T.M.C. Asser 2012)] The question that many scholars are dealing with in the past months, following the 3 April 2012 update by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), is whether the Palestine-ICC chapter should be regarded as closed. In this short analysis I intend to delineate why, in my opinion, the Palestine-ICC chapter is far from over. The issue is of particular relevance in these very days for two reasons: as further explained below, over the next weeks both the UN General Assembly and the ICC Assembly of States Parties will have to deal (much depending on the choices of the Palestinian Authority) with the question of Palestine, which will ultimately have an impact on the possible opening of the investigation before the ICC. The starting point is that the 3 April 2012 update/memorandum/statement (as it has been variously called) by the OTP on the situation in Palestine is in fact a decision. This means that the preliminary examination on the situation is closed, as are the preliminary examinations of the situations of Iraq and Venezuela, which are indeed listed on the same ICC web page under the link "decision not to proceed” (which, by the way, is not the appropriate expression, since the decision not to proceed only comes at the end of the investigation stage, thus these cases should correctly be defined “decisions not to investigate”). According to internal OTP sources, the ambiguity contained in the “update”'s two pages and its deceptive title, was apparent to its authors. The final document - which was apparently issued in a rush notwithstanding 39 months of preliminary examination - was the result of diverging and irreconcilable positions inside the OTP, which allegedly led to the deletion of several arguments and the associated reasoning. I will refrain from criticizing again the poor content of these two pages, since other scholars have already well done it: see, among the others, the comments by Michael Kearney, and William Schabas. Irrespective of its merits, pursuant to article 15(6) of the Rome Statute, relevant actors, such as inter alia the victims’ representatives, who delivered information to the OTP and communicated with the office during the preliminary examination, should have been notified of the decision. The OTP alleges to have done so, and that more than 300 notifications were sent out, but apparently organizations like the PCHR, which represents hundreds of Gaza victims and provided information and documentation to the OTP, have not received any notification. Apart from these preliminary observations, some more substantial questions arise from the procedure which was adopted by the then Prosecutor – Luis Moreno Ocampo - to deal with the Palestine situation. These are more serious questions that go beyond the case at hand and touch upon the extent of the discretional powers of the Prosecutor and the judicial remedies provided before the ICC. Some of these questions are outlined below.

Two posts today by ostensibly progressive bloggers claim that MEK has not been involved in a terrorist attack in years.  Joshua Keating at FP: The idea that a group blamed for the killing of six Americans in the 1970s, as well as dozens of deadly terrorist bombings against Iranian targets afte,r that is “the largest peaceful, secular, pro-democratic Iranian dissident group”...

Just in case you are not yet convinced that the Obama administration's counterterrorism policies are actually worse than the Bush administration's: The officials said U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had made the decision to remove MEK from the list, and that it was expected to be formally announced in coming days. The State Department said that Clinton sent a classified communication...

Just another day in America's own gulag: A special Obama administration task force review found in 2009 that Latif, who had been held at Gitmo since early 2002 and had waged a long legal battle for his freedom, could be released, a conclusion that could only be reached by a unanimous vote of all U.S. intelligence agencies. That finding was buttressed a...