How does citizenship fit into the al-Awlaki picture? It's obviously important. Otherwise he's just another senior-level al Qaeda operative taken out by a drone. Not insignificant, but not an event that would generate a lot of discussion, especially not on the law. On the other hand, imagine if al-Awlaki had been an American not of Middle Eastern descent and not a...
The best argument against disclosure is that it would reveal classified information or, relatedly, acknowledge a covert action. This concern is often a legitimate bar to publishing secret executive branch legal opinions. But the administration has (in unattributed statements) acknowledged and touted the U.S. role in the al-Aulaqi killing, and even President Obama said that the killing was in part “a tribute to our intelligence community.” I understand the reasons the government needs to preserve official deniability for a covert action, but I think that a legal analysis of the U.S. ability to target and kill enemy combatants (including U.S. citizens) outside Afghanistan can be disclosed without revealing means or methods of intelligence-gathering or jeopardizing technical covertness. The public legal explanation need not say anything about the means of fire (e.g. drones or something else), or particular countries, or which agencies of the U.S. government are involved, or the intelligence basis for the attacks. (Whether the administration should release more information about the intelligence supporting al-Aulaqi’s operational role is a separate issue that raises separate classified information concerns.) We know the government can provide a public legal analysis of this sort because presidential counterterrorism advisor John Brennan and State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh have given such legal explanations in speeches, albeit in limited and conclusory terms. These speeches show that there is no bar in principle to a public disclosure of a more robust legal analysis of targeted killings like al-Aulaqi’s. So too do the administration’s many leaks of legal conclusions (and operational details) about the al-Aulaqi killing.The public accountability and legitimacy of these vital national security operations is strengthened to the extent that the public is informed and, through the political branches, part of the debate on the law of targeted killing. That cannot be operational discussion, for obvious reasons. But there is still a good deal that could be said about the underlying legal rationales, without compromising security. I myself favor revisions, either as internal executive branch policy or, in a better world, as formal legal revisions to Title 50 (CIA, covert action, etc.) and the oversight and reporting processes. One of those revisions would be to get beyond the not just silly, but in some deeper way, de-legitimizing insistence that these operations cannot be acknowledged even as a program; I would establish a distinct category of “deniable” rather than “covert,” and a category of programs that can be acknowledged as existing even without comment on particular operations. John Bellinger, the former State Department Legal Adviser in the last years of the Bush administration, raises concerns in the Washington Post today about the best way to defend the international legitimacy of these operations. He notes the deep hostility of the international advocacy groups, UN special raporteurs, numbers of foreign governments, and the studied silence of US allies (even as NATO, I’d add, has relied upon drones as an essential element of its Libyan air war).
[T]he U.S. legal position may not satisfy the rest of the world. No other government has said publicly that it agrees with the U.S. policy or legal rationale for drones. European allies, who vigorously criticized the Bush administration for asserting the unilateral right to use force against terrorists in countries outside Afghanistan, have neither supported nor criticized reported U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Instead, they have largely looked the other way, as they did with the killing of Osama bin Laden. Human rights advocates, on the other hand, while quiet for several years (perhaps to avoid criticizing the new administration), have grown increasingly uncomfortable with drone attacks. Last year, the U.N. rapporteur for summary executions and extrajudicial killings said that drone strikes may violate international humanitarian and human rights law and could constitute war crimes. U.S. human rights groups, which stirred up international opposition to Bush administration counterterrorism policies, have been quick to condemn the Awlaki killing. Even if Obama administration officials are satisfied that drone strikes comply with domestic and international law, they would still be wise to try to build a broader international consensus. The administration should provide more information about the strict limits it applies to targeting and about who has been targeted. One of the mistakes the Bush administration made in its first term was adopting novel counterterrorism policies without attempting to explain and secure international support for them.The problem of international legitimacy is always tricky, as Bellinger knows better than anyone. I look at it this way. Tell the international community that we care about legitimacy — which is to say, that we care about their opinion in relation to our practices — and all of sudden we have handed other folks a rhetorical hold-up, to a greater or lesser degree. Unsurprisingly, the price of their good opinion and their desire to exercise control over our actions goes up. There is nothing special to this; it’s just standard bargaining theory.
There appears to be some agreement that continuous combat functionaries (CCF) that belong to an armed group that is involved in an armed conflict may be targeted "anywhere, anytime". I agree with this position and even had Kevin cite p. 206 of Gary Solis' book as affirmation of that position. The question is what is the legal justification for "anytime,...
Trade treaties with South Korea, Columbia, and Panama are finally advancing, with President Obama set to send the three deals to Congress for approval this week, reports the WSJ this morning. The agreements had been tied up in acrimonious domestic politics for some five years, but it appears that bipartisan desire to improve the US export picture has moved things...
The Supreme Court has an incredibly thin diet for international law cases this term. No blockbuster cases, no major questions of international law, no issues addressing executive power in the foreign affairs arena. Thin, thin, thin. Thus far it appears that there are only two cases that tangentially address questions of interest to this blog, and neither are particularly...
Eli Lake and John Barry at the Daily Beast sum up the Obama administration’s counterterrorism-on-offense doctrines. Of particular interest is this paragraph stressing the largely unmentioned role of on-the-ground intelligence gathering and operations in order to make possible targeted strikes: And while the drones are the most outward signs of the covert campaigns that rage from the Horn of Africa to Pakistan, it...
It appears the right-wing has settled on a shiny new historical comparison to justify the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki. Here is Jack Goldsmith in the New York Times: An attack on an enemy soldier during war is not an assassination. During World War II, the United States targeted and killed Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, the architect of the Japanese...
The following is a guest-post by David Glazier, Associate Professor of Law at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles. Our thanks to him for providing it. As Kevin noted on Wednesday, the Department of Defense approved military commission charges against Abd Al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad Al Nashiri, alleged USS Cole bombing mastermind, clearing the way for his arraignment and subsequent trial. ...
Luke Peterson passed along a tip about this interesting declaration attached to the U.S.-Rwanda Bilateral Investment Treaty: Articles 3 through 10 and other provisions that qualify or create exceptions to these Articles are self-executing. With the exception of these Articles, the Treaty is not self-executing. None of the provisions in this Treaty confers a private right of action. Articles 3...
