Did Obama “Bungle” His Sudan Policy?

I am pretty supportive of Obama Administration’s general approach to Sudan, largely because it reflects a realistic sense of the limits of the U.S. government’s ability to influence matters there as well as the (relative) unimportance of Sudan to the U.S. and to the wider region. And so I think the hardline ICC-favored approach to Sudan (demand the arrest of Bashir as a primary condition of further participation in Sudan’s peace process) is both unrealistic and self-defeating in the short term.  Then again, I (and Obama) could be wrong, as John Norris at Foreign Policy, argues. Still, even Norris presumes that the administration will have to work with the existing regime and leadership:

There’s no need to sacrifice U.S. policy goals to lofty truth-telling. In fact, there’s a case to be made that diplomatic goals are actually better achieved with frank honesty when elections don’t pass the smell test. For example, if the administration had taken a tougher line with Khartoum about creating the underlying conditions for a free and fair national election, the country would already be further down the road toward creating genuine power-sharing in Sudan. Such an arrangement would in turn incentivize Bashir not to engage in adventurism around the upcoming independence referendum, and it would be an important step toward preventing future conflicts in Northern Sudan — after the South heads for the exit. Would negotiating all this be difficult? Absolutely. Yet, grasping the nettle now seems far preferable to watching from the sidelines as Sudan descends into broader conflict — again.

So if shouting about democracy from the rooftops à la George W. Bush was not effective, neither will be defending democracy in mumbled tones. One hopes that this administration has learned from its initial stumbles. Obama will have an important opportunity to get it right when he offers his first public comments on Sudan’s election in the days to come.