The Poor Sudanese Government — What Else Could They Have Done?

Everything you need to know about the majority’s dismissive attitude toward the Prosecution’s evidence of genocide is contained in this paragraph:

179. In relation to the alleged insufficient resources allocated by the GoS to ensure adequate conditions of life in IDP Camps in Darfur, the Majority considers that the Prosecution’s allegation is vague in light of the fact that, in addition to the Prosecution’s failure to provide any specific information as to what possible additional resources could have been provided by the GoS, there existed an ongoing armed conflict at the relevant time and the number of IDPS, according to the United Nations, was as high as two million by mid 2004, and as high as 2.7 million today.

Really, how could the Sudanese government be expected not to subject the IDPs to slow-death conditions, given the millions of people its “counter-insurgency” displaced?  What other “additional resources” could it possibly have provided them?  After all, it was busy spending 70% of its oil revenue — $1.2 billion in 2000, $4.6 billion in 2006 — on building up its military.  That leaves a mere 30% for skyscrapers, five-star hotels, golf courses, and graft.  Sorry, Darfuris, there simply isn’t anything left for food and water and shelter.  You will just have to die.  That’s not genocide — that’s just fiscal reality.