Sovereign Accountability for Human Rights Abuses

Sovereign Accountability for Human Rights Abuses

One of the unintended consequences of the movement to hold corporations liable for aiding and abetting human rights abuses is that doing so may prove to be the most effective way of holding sovereigns accountable. That is the surprising conclusion of my latest article just published in the Notre Dame Law Review. Here is an excerpt:

One has a nagging suspicion that human rights litigation against corporations is a proxy fight in which the accomplice is pursued while the principal evades punishment. Indeed, if a corporation is accused of “aiding and abetting” human rights abuses, this is all but a concession that the corporate actor is not the principal wrongdoer. It is of course possible that this controversial trend toward corporate responsibility may reflect a genuine concern about corporate abuse of power. But more likely it reflects an abiding frustration that the primary perpetrators-sovereigns-are beyond the reach of most victims. If victims cannot pursue claims against the principal, they will resign themselves to pursue claims against those who aid and abet.

How have we come to this state of affairs, in which the corporation is pursued while the sovereign evades punishment? Why should the corporate accomplice alone be found liable if the sovereign is the primary malfeasor? For the first time in scholarly literature, this Article suggests an alternative approach, a solution to this conundrum. It suggests that corporations have existing tools to remedy the situation, drawing on principles derived from human rights, contract law, and arbitration. The essential idea is that if a corporation is found liable for aiding and abetting human rights abuse, it may invoke contractual provisions in the agreement with the sovereign to arbitrate the question of shared responsibility. While the victims may not pursue the sovereign, there is no impediment for a corporation that is found liable to pursue the sovereign in arbitration to secure its share of liability, either in the form of contribution or indemnification. In short, human rights litigation against the corporation could lead to “who pays” arbitration against the sovereign….

The purpose of this Article is not to affirm or disaffirm this trend of holding corporations liable under international law. Rather its purpose is to recognize an observable trend in human rights litigation patterns and consider its ramifications. If corporations increasingly are subject to international responsibility, then this portends new avenues for holding sovereigns responsible for their share of the liability….

Human rights litigation followed by “who pays” arbitration is a two-step process that overcomes the traditional immunity that sovereigns enjoy in human rights litigation. Thus far, human rights litigants have attempted to scale an impregnable wall of sovereign immunity by relying on awkward FSIA tools such as commercial activity or implied waivers. But corporations have no such difficulties. They can invoke provisions in their contracts that were specifically drafted to fulfill the relatively straightforward FSIA exceptions of express waiver and arbitration. Corporations typically cannot implead and crossclaim against the sovereign in the underlying litigation. But they can do the next best thing by arbitrating the question of who pays for the human rights abuses. Effectively, the arbitration procedure operates as a second-tier cross-claim by one malfeasor against the other.

What is particularly important about this paradigm shift is that heretofore human rights abuse has been a relatively cost-free enterprise for perpetrators, particularly sovereigns…. But with corporate liability that equation changes dramatically. To use Guido Calabresi’s scheme of cost avoidance, monetary incentives are placed on corporations to change their conduct so as to reduce the number and severity of human rights violations…. And by imposing a cost on corporations that aid and abet sovereign abuse, those corporations will become cost avoiders…. Holding corporations liable and then arbitrating who pays is a mechanism of imposing costs and then spreading the costs, resulting in the corporation and the sovereign becoming cost avoiders. By imposing and spreading costs to the secondary and primary perpetrators, greater fairness between the malfeasors is achieved and deterrence from human rights abuse is enhanced. Contractual arbitration between the corporation and the sovereign over who pays transfers costs imposed on the corporation and creates shared incentives to implement and enforce human rights obligations.

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Benjamin Davis
Benjamin Davis

Very interesting! My wonder is whether the type of person who sits as an arbitrator in an international commercial arbitration is a person who can meaningfully analyze a human rights claim? Or whether the typical international commercial arbitration lawyer can effectively argue the “who pays” human rights claim? Started also thinking about whether those who make the “odious debts” with which the sovereign would pay could be seen as a third step attack on the sovereign. If the sovereign can be the efficient tortfeasor and get financing for its human rights pay outs to corporations it seems a kind of human rights abuse financial mechanism is put in place. Not sure where this idea is going but these are some that struck me from the post.

Best,

Ben

Tobias Thienel

Prof. Alford, I’ve been wondering: why is it that corporations sued for aiding and abetting violations of international law by a State are not, as you say, immune from suit? I have a feeling the only answer for present purposes may be in the FSIA, and the view that FSIA is not only the only way of obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign State, but also the only accepted source of sovereign immunity. Nonetheless, the question of international law remains. As we all know, the inherent justification of immunity ratione materiae, that is to say, the immunity of (any serving or former State organ for his or her) official acts is par in parem non habet imperium: one State does not have (judicial) authority over the acts of another sovereign, and hence cannot arrogate such to itself. That being so, could it not be said that, if a State finds a private corporation liable for aiding and abetting the wrongful acts of a foreign State, it lays claim to jurisdiction over the latter acts as surely as if it had sued or indicted the official who in fact carried them out? The difference, if any, would seem to lie (only?) in… Read more »

Tobias Thienel

In the next square brackets after my citation of Jones, Chuidian and Bellinger, that should, of course, have been ‘your argument’, not ‘our argument’. My apologies.

Tor Hershman

Blind Justice is simply a whore and whomsoever can put the most of what that harlot desires…..wins, and that is, ‘twas and t’will be the totality of The Law.

Stay on groovin’ safari,

Tor Hershman

Matthew Gross
Matthew Gross

I wish any company attempting to work out such “who pays” arbitration the best of luck.

Given that Shell and Exxon can’t even get Nigeria to pay their share of their joint venture obligations I’m rather doubtful a company would see anything.

One has a nagging suspicion that human rights litigation against corporations is a proxy fight in which the accomplice is pursued while the principal evades punishment.

“A nagging suspicion” is a rather sublime understatement. I would consider it a case of who the money can actually be bludgeoned out of.