The Relationship Between the VCCR and Miranda

Appellant was … arrested and taken to the police station where, with the services of an interpreter, he was questioned by Sergeant Knight, of the Minneapolis Police Department, and Lynn Hoff, a Hennepin County Child Protective Services investigator. Knight gave appellant a Miranda advisory through the interpreter. After stating each right, Knight asked appellant if he understood that right. When appellant indicated that he did not understand the right to remain silent, Knight restated the right until appellant indicated his understanding. Appellant said that he understood each of the remaining rights. Appellant declined an attorney and agreed to answer questions from Knight and Hoff. Appellant initially denied having any sexual contact with complainant, but ultimately confessed…

Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress his custodial statement on the grounds that … he was not advised of his right to contact the Mexican Consulate, a violation of article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention).

In Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court noted that the Vienna Convention does not provide for suppression as a remedy, and that the rights asserted to be protected by the Vienna Convention are safeguarded by constitutional and statutory protections applicable to both citizens and foreign detainees in the United States. The Supreme Court further observed that no other signatories to the Vienna Convention use suppression as a remedy for due process violations, making it unlikely that such a sanction was envisioned. The Supreme Court acknowledged that a foreign detainee can nonetheless raise the issue of violation of the Vienna Convention as part of a broader challenge to the voluntariness of a statement to police.

We now hold that suppression is not an appropriate remedy for violation of a foreign detainee’s rights under article 36 of the Vienna Convention, but may be considered in assessing whether a statement was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

Appellant argues that because he would have heeded advice from the consulate not to speak to the police without an attorney, he was prejudiced and is therefore entitled to suppression… Essentially, appellant asserted to the district court that waiver of his rights was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. A state may not introduce a defendant’s in-custody statements absent the defendant’s voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights….

In this case, there is no evidence that the police coerced appellant to waive his constitutional rights, and his subjective motivations for waiving his rights and making a confession are irrelevant to a determination that the statement was not coerced by the government and was therefore voluntary. Even if appellant would have heeded advice from the consulate not to talk to the police without a lawyer present, it does not make his statement involuntary. The district court did not err in concluding that appellant’s statement and confession were voluntary, and did not err in denying his motion to suppress.