31 Dec Armenian Genocide Claims Dismissed
A federal district court in Los Angeles has rendered an important decision dismissing claims for alleged victims of the Armenian Genocide. At issue in Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank is a California statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 354.45, which extended until December 31, 2016 the statute of limitations for, inter alia, looted assets claims brought by victims of the Armenian Genocide or their heirs or beneficiaries. Here is the key section of the decision:
Applying Garamendi, and Deutsch, the court concludes that the statute exceeds California’s power to engage in foreign affairs. As a result, it cannot apply § 354.45 to extend the statute of limitations on plaintiffs’ Class B claims….
The Constitution allocates “the foreign relations power” to the federal government and vests the authority to decide what the nation’s foreign policy should be in the executive branch. See Garamendi. The executive has authority to enter into treaties and “executive agreements” with foreign governments, including agreements that resolve the wartime claims of American citizens. The power of the federal government to resolve wartime claims extends not only to claims against a foreign government itself, but also to claims against its nationals, including corporations….
Just as § 354.6 created a cause of action for victims of slave or forced labor during World War II, § 354.45 creates a cause of action for those who were victims of the Armenian Genocide that culminated during World War I, and their heirs and beneficiaries. Like § 354.6, which extended the statute of limitations on forced labor claims to 2010, § 354.45 extends the statute of limitations governing Armenian Genocide claims to 2016. The question is whether the federal government previously exercised its exclusive power to resolve claims arising out of World War I through post-war diplomacy, and thus whether the state statute impermissibly intrudes on the federal government’s foreign affairs power.
The answer to this question is clearly yes. In the Claims Agreement Between the United States of America and Turkey (the “Ankara Agreement”), the Republic of Turkey agreed to pay the United States a “lump sum” of $1,300,000 “in full settlement of the claims of American citizens which are embraced by the Agreement of December 24, 1923.” That agreement-embodied in an exchange of notes-in turn provided that the “reciprocal claims” of American and Turkish nationals based on acts occurring during World War I would be adjudicated by a mixed claim commission.
Following payment of the lump sum settlement, Fred. K. Nielsen–who had been assigned to the Turkish-American Claims Commission by the President in February 1933 and who executed the Ankara Agreement on the President’s behalf–submitted a report to the Secretary of State to document the process by which the settlement was reached and the manner in which it should be distributed. Nielsen recognized that the “claims of persons … considered to be persons of Turkish origin under Turkish law” were not filed with (but rather only “furnished to”) the Commission, due to Turkey’s refusal to recognize its liability for such claims. Nielsen made clear, however, that the parties intended the Ankara Agreement to be a final settlement of all such claims: “While … the Commission did not consider the[ ] claims of naturalized citizens of Turkish origin [in reaching the amount of the lump sum settlement], the Agreement of October 25, 1934 concluded by the two Governments was framed to effect a final settlement of all outstanding claims of the nationals of each country against the other …” Nielsen stated that Article II of the Ankara Agreement-which provides that “the Government of the Republic of Turkey will be released from liability with respect to all [claims of American citizens which are embraced by the Agreement of December 24, 1923],” and that “every [such] claim … shall be considered and treated as finally settled”-was intended to effectuate a universal settlement of all claims “in harmony with international practice in relation to such matters,” as exemplified by previously executed reparations treaties that contained facially broader release and settlement clauses.
Nielsen’s report is reflective of the diplomatic negotiations that culminated in the execution of the Ankara Agreement. As letters exchanged by the parties prior to execution of the agreement make clear, the “lump sum” settlement was in lieu of the separate adjudication of disputed claims before a mixed claims commission, and was intended to settle the wartime claims of American nationals of both Ottoman and non-Ottoman origin….
In short, the executive agreements into which the United States and Turkey entered following World War I demonstrate that the United States elected to settle the claims of victims of the Armenian Genocide through the Ankara Agreement. While California may consider the settlement the United States reached inadequate, see generally S.B. 1524, “[t]he federal government, acting under its foreign affairs authority, provided its own resolution to the war [and] California has no power to modify that resolution.”
It is worth emphasizing that the Ankara Agreement itself did not include claims of Armenians in the lump sum settlement amount, as Turkey refused to recognize its liability for those claims. But based on the Nielsen report, the claims of all Americans, including Armenian-Americans, were resolved in the Ankara Agreement. In other words, the United States agreed to waive all compensation for claims of Armenian-Americans, and thereby preempted the right of those individuals to individually pursue their claims. The Ankara Agreement does not say that, but the court concluded that the negotiating history as set forth by Nielsen reflects that intent.
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