06 Aug ICC Submissions and the “Continuing Violation” (Non-)Doctrine
I expect very little from the media in terms of legal accuracy, particularly concerning the ICC. But this article — reproduced in one form or another in dozens of newspapers — is still a doozy:
The International Criminal Court may try former Namibian president Sam Nujoma and three others in connection with the disappearance of hundreds of people.
A local newspaper reported on Monday that hundreds of Namibians under the care of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (Swapo) disappeared in exile just before and after the country’s independence in 1990, and it is believed that they were killed and their bodies dumped in a mountain crevasse near Lubango in Angola.
Most of the missing Swapo “detainees” were accused of spying for apartheid South Africa during the battle for independence.
The National Society for Human Rights (NSHR), which took the submission to the International Criminal Court (ICC), said it had obtained accounts from former Swapo combatants and members of Angola’s secret service of how the corpses of massacre victims were pushed down the crevasse, said to be 700 to 800m deep.
[snip]
The NSHR wants Nujoma – who is the current president of Swapo – and three others to be investigated for “instigation, planning, supervision, abetting, aiding, defending and/or perpetuating” the disappearances of the Namibians in exile.
Nujoma was commander-in-chief of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia, Swapo’s military wing, during the liberation struggle and also assumed the responsibility of commander-in-chief of the Namibia Defence Force after independence.
[snip]
According to The Namibian newspaper, the ICC confirmed to the NSHR that it received the submission and was weighing the merits of the case.
In a dossier submitted to the ICC in November last year, the NSHR said Nujoma’s continued refusal to reveal the facts about the fate and whereabouts of about 4 200 missing people qualified him to be tried under the “continuous violation doctrine” of the international court.
The NSHR argues that Nujoma was head of Swapo at the time of the disappearances, and that he continues to scuttle any investigation into the April 1989 incident, where more than 370 Swapo fighters were mysteriously killed by South African forces, for fear that it might also shed light on the fate and whereabouts of the missing Swapo detainees.
The NSHR also wants Nujoma to be tried for gross violations in the Kavango region, which borders Angola, between 1994 and 1996. At the height of Unita’s attacks on northern Namibia, Nujoma imposed a state of emergency and ordered security forces to shoot on sight anyone crossing or found near the border.
The article betrays a complete failure to understand how the ICC operates. The fact that the Prosecutor is “weighing the merits” of NSHR’s submission quite literally means nothing — Article 15 of the Rome Statute requires the Prosecutor to “analyse the seriousness” of any communication he receives concerning a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, no matter how frivolous that communication may be. To date, for example, the Prosecutor has received 1732 communications from 103 countries, 80% of which “were found to be manifestly outside jurisdiction after initial review.” Of the remaining 20% — approximately 340 communications — only 10 led to “intensive analysis” and only 3 proceeded to investigation (the Prosecutor is still analyzing 5). It is thus the height of journalistic irresponsibility to write that “[t]he International Criminal Court may try former Namibian president Sam Nujoma and three others in connection with the disappearance of hundreds of people,” at least without giving some context to the overwhelming likelihood that NSHR’s submission will go nowhere.
Nor is that all. The article also uncritically parrots NSHR’s claim that the ICC would have jurisdiction over the murders pursuant to its “continuing violation doctrine.” There is one significant problem with that argument: the ICC doesn’t have such a doctrine. There is no mention of the “continuing violation doctrine” in the Rome Statute or in any decision of the Court. Nor has the doctrine ever been used by either the ICTY or ICTR.
To be sure, the “continuing violation doctrine” does exist in international law. In Moiwana Village v. Suriname, for example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights used it to assert jurisdiction over a massacre that took place before Suriname became a party to the American Convention on Human Rights. In the Court’s view, Suriname’s failure to investigate the massacre after ratifying the American Convention meant that the massacre was a “continuing violation” that fell within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction.
The fact that the doctrine exists, however, does not mean that the ICC will use it. Indeed, I would be shocked if it does. A significant number of States would not have ratified the Rome Statute if it gave the Court retroactive temporal jurisdiction (crimes committed before July 1, 2002), understandably — if regrettably — not wanting to expose their past behavior to judicial scrutiny. The continuing-violation doctrine would effectively erase that limitation, allowing the Court to prosecute any pre-2002 crime that a State failed to investigate after 2002. Such a dramatic expansion of the Court’s temporal jurisdiction would not only undermine the ICC’s ability to attract new members, it would almost certainly lead many current members to withdraw from the Court — a catastrophic result.
It is easy to feel tremendous sympathy for those who suffered at the hands of Swapo’s murderous regime. I wish the ICC could prosecute Nujoma and the others. Unfortunately, that is simply not the case — and the author of the article does Swapo’s victims and their families a grave disservice by implying otherwise.
I believe that the continuing violation doctrine must apply. Article 21 (2) and (3) of the ICC Statute respectively state that the ICC shall apply “principles and rules of international law” and that “[t]he application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights . . . .” These provisions strongly suggest that the continuing violation doctrine must be applied by the ICC. Although Moiwana Village v. Suriname only applied the doctrine to Suriname’s failure to investigate a massacre and a state actor does not (as I recall) incur international criminal liability for failing to undertake such an investigation, the doctrine can apply to other acts under the ICC. For example, if a military commander “[w]ilfully depriv[ed] a prisoner of war . . . of the rights of fair and regular trial” (ICC Statute, art. 8(2)(a)(vi)before a state became a party to the Treaty of Rome and the PoW is still incarcerated after the state became a party, then the doctrine should apply.
Francisco Forrest Martin
I agree with Kevin here – the continuing violation doctrine exists for internationally wrongful acts, as a matter of the law of state responsibility. There it has quite a pedigree – see Art. 14 of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility. That is why human rights courts applied this doctrine, as they indeed do decide on matters of state responsibility. This is simply not an issue which is any way specific to human rights law, but a question of general international law and a court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis, and I just don’t see how or why Art. 21(3) of the Rome Statute should apply. Not to mention the fact, of course, that there are some human rights judgments on this question which are decidedly not very human rights friendly – see Blecic v. Croatia. The ICC’s jurisdiction is a different matter. The substantive question is not one of the secondary rules of the law of state responsibility regarding continuing violations, but of primary rules of international criminal law and the Rome Statute’s jurisdictional provisions. And, even if we were to assume that the ICC would affirm its jurisdiction under the circumstances of Prof. Martin’s hypo, that is a far cry… Read more »
I do not think that there would be many appropriate applications of the continuing violation doctrine to ICC crimes, but my single example is one case in which the doctrine must apply. If a PoW is being imprisoned after the cessation of hostilities and after the detaining power has become a party to the Treaty of Rome, the deprivation of rights to a fair and regular trial are not merely continuing but present because, well, the PoW never received a trial. (This case is distinguishable from the Eur.Ct. H.R. case mentioned in Blecic v. Croatia in which a person DID have a trial, which occurred before the state became a party to the ECHR — although I am not too happy about that case’s outcome.) Although I share Prof. Heller’s policy concerns about the ICC applying the continuing violation doctrine, this is one example where it only makes sense to apply the doctrine.
Francisco Forrest Martin
Francisco,
Regarding your hypothetical, I still do not believe that the ICC could prosecute the military commander for depriving the POW of a fair and regular trial. The same policy concerns apply: your theory would give the ICC jurisdiction over any case involving a prisoner (POW or civilian) who was still incarcerated post-July 1, 2002, no matter how much earlier he or she had been deprived of a fair trial. 5 years, 10, 25 — it wouldn’t matter.
That said, I think it is clear that the Court could prosecute the military commander for the war crime of unlawful confinement, because the POW would still be unlawfully confined after July 1, 2002. But that would not require application of the continuing-violation doctrine, because the actus reus of the crime would be the post-July 1, 2002, confinement, not the earlier confinement. (Which perhaps raises some interesting sentencing issues.)
Your thoughts?
Kevin,
I think that you are right and I am wrong. Indeed, on further reflection, I don’t think that the continuing violation doctrine need apply to any other ICC crimes because any arguably continuing violation is picked up by another crime.
Thanks for straightening out my thinking.
Forrest