Explaining the Vitriol

I wanted to say just a few words about Julian’s comment below to the effect that both sides are taking cheap shots in the debate over terrorism. I agree that some criticism of the Administration and its policies goes over the line – see the examples collected in this Boston Globe column by Jeff Jacoby. I also agree that some of the criticism has become intemperate (and perhaps I am among the guilty). A possible explanation for that, which I suggested in this post in July, is that those who oppose the Bush policies are fed up with the Administration not just because of the substance of the policy but also because it is utterly unwilling ever to admit error (or, as David Scheffer observes here of last week’s speech, that the President “just doesn’t get it”). Even in the wake of the apparent loss in Hamdan, the Administration bounced right back as if nothing had happened.

There is also a prevailing unwillingness on the part of this Administration to engage on the issues. Real debate becomes difficult and name-calling is the result. I do think that most of the blame here lies with the Administration. Imagine if Administration officials intelligently discussed questions of IL and anti-terrorism practices in the way that Ken Anderson does here. The disagreements would persist of course, but the bad blood would be diluted.

As for “grandiose claims about the uncontested supremacy of international law” (see also Fernando Teson’s comment to a post last week), I imagine one could line up many such statements, possibly even from respectable sources. But there’s an asymmetry here – those claims are coming from mere commentators, where the article II grandiosity is coming from those who exercise the power. And of course you can find many observers and other actors who are much more tempered in their assertions of the relevance of international law. My own view is that some IL arguments fly here, some don’t, and that in some cases the international community is now in a position to make them stick (a largely descriptive claim, not the normative one that Teson addresses). But we should have moved beyond the debate about whether IL is ever relevant, something the Administration still seems basically unwilling to do (although obviously there are elements within the executive branch that think otherwise, and who are finally making some headway, as described in articles such as this one). Given this history, I think the first olive branch has to come from the Administration, not its critics.