13 Aug Reflections on Resolution 1701
One of the most interesting aspects of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 is what it might mean for the future of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. There are several provisions of U.N. Resolution 1701 that I find of particular importance as they relate to the future of Hezbollah:
The Security Council …
3. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon….
8. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements… full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State….
12. Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, authorizes UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence….
14. Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related material and requests UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11 to assist the Government of Lebanon at its request;
15. Decides further that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft: (a) The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned,…
I read this to require Lebanon to take full control of its territory, support the disarmament of Hezbollah, secure the Lebanese border and support an arms embargo against the shipment of arms to Hezbollah. It also authorizes the UNIFIL troops on the ground in Lebanon to take the necessary steps to prevent armed attacks by Hezbollah from Lebanon.
Israeli Ambassador Dan Gillerman interpreted the resolution as “establish[ing] a binding arms embargo requiring all States to prevent the supply of arms and weapons to militias and terrorists in Lebanon. It provided for a radically different international force with a mandate and capability to use all necessary means to create a new situation in Lebanon, in which the borders would be secure. Hizbollah would not rearm, and Lebanese armed forces would deploy throughout Lebanese territory including along the Blue Line.”
That seems like a proper interpretation of 1701. The Lebanese cabinet reportedly is divided over the prospect of the disarmament of Hezbollah as mandated by 1701, but has accepted the resolution to end the war.
One wonders what the future of Hezbollah in Lebanon will be if the resolution is given full effect. But, of course, as Israeli Foreign Minister Livni said following the Israeli Cabinet’s approval of the cease-fire earlier today, “I live in the Middle East and I know that decisions are not always implemented.”
But, of course, the Israeli Foreign Minister might well have said, “I live in the Middle East, and I well know that my government has long defied internationally supported resolutions passed by the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. What is more, we’ve proven particularly adept at ignoring international humanitarian law as found, for example, in the Fourth Geneva Convention and which requires an occupying power to protect the status quo, human rights, and prospects for self-determination of the occupied people, in our case, the Palestinians.”
I have a few interpretive questions about the resolution and would be interested in hearing what others have to say. (1) There seems to be some disagreement about whether or not unsc res 1701 was given effect under chapter VI or VII of the charter. I am a little uncertain about the cause of the confusion because on this point the resolution seems to be fairly unambiguous. If I may draw your attention to PP10 of the resolution, the text reads “Determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security” and then goes on to call for a cease-fire and elaborate on some of the particulars. At first blush this seems to be a clear article 39 reference. Moreover, the *determination* has a suspicious juxtapositioning — it appears right before the first operative paragraph — which, to me, suggests a legal basis for for all of the subsequent material in the resolution. In my judgment this puts the res 1701 squarely under chapter VII. Does anyone want to make some contrarian observations. (2) I also want to make note of the language the council used to describe the authority UNIFIL will have to executive its… Read more »
jon:
I think Professor Anthony D’Amato (Opinio Juris alumnus) over at JURIST endeavors to address at least some of these interpretative questions in his paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of SC Resolution 1701.
I’m not at all qualified to comment on the cogency or persuasiveness of his analysis.