Commemorating Hiroshima — Was it a War Crime?

Commemorating Hiroshima — Was it a War Crime?

Saturday was the 60th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima. Tens of thousands of Japanese thronged Peace Park in downtown Hiroshima to commemorate the attack, which killed nearly 140,000 people. From all accounts, the ceremony was deeply moving, a tribute to the need to abolish nuclear weapons once and for all:

During the ceremony, children dressed in black and white, the colours of mourning, laid wreathes of flowers at a simple, arch-shaped memorial.

Ladles of water were also offered for those who suffered the atomic heat. As dusk fell, paper lanterns were floated down a river by the park to represent the souls of the dead.

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said that, after the bomb, the city had relentlessly pursued peace.

“The citizens of Hiroshima are the witnesses of global peace, we hope that Hiroshima will continue to be the symbol of global peace,” he said.

[snip]

Hiroshima‘s mayor, Tadatoshi Akiba, led the crowd in a minute of silence, 60 years on from the instant the blast struck the city.

A huge metal bell tolled in memory of the victims.

Mr Akiba warned nuclear powers that they were “jeopardising human survival” by clinging on to their arsenals.

“We have to pay due tribute to all the souls claimed by the atomic bomb,” he said. “We will not make the same mistake again.”

As the BBC story notes, there is still considerable controversy over whether Truman’s decision to drop “Little Boy” on Hiroshima was a war crime. Indeed, a mock tribunal held last month concluded that it was:

Japanese and South Korean atomic-bomb survivors were invited to the two-day tribunal at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum building to tell about their sufferings.

Three law experts from the United States, Costa Rica and Japan posing as judges recommended the United States apologize to atomic-bomb survivors, pay damages to them and promise never to use nuclear weapons again.

Japanese and South Korean lawyers who played the role of public prosecutors indicted 15 people who were involved in the bombings, including then Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Robert Oppenheimer, a U.S. scientist who has been credited with developing atomic bombs.

Accepting the prosecutors’ claims, Lennox Hinds, a U.S. professor specializing in international law who acted as a judge, said the bombings were the act of “an indiscriminate extermination of all forms of life” and that the targeted cities were like “guinea pigs” used in an experiment to measure the impact of atomic bombing.

Hinds also maintained that “the defendants knew or should have known of the destructive impact of this weapon” but still decided to use it.

Historians have also debated whether the attack was justified on the History News Network, a fascinating blog run by George Mason. Here is a snippet from Philip Nobile’s opening argument for the “prosecution”:

I accuse President Harry S Truman of war crimes under Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter outlawing “the wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.”

Specifically, I accuse President Truman of ordering the annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki via an experimental terror weapon resulting in the massacre and maiming of some 200,000 Japanese women, children and old people.

[snip]

Although the Nuremberg Charter improvised on crimes against peace and crimes against humanity, the war crimes provisions were hardly novel. International law was clear about the limits of warfare. According to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the Paris Peace Pact of 1928, civilian slaughters were considered criminal. Consequently, Article 6 Paragraph b of the Charter did not break new ground in its definition of war crimes:

(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoner of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.

Note well two points: (1) “Military necessity” refers to emergency battle conditions during which armies and navies are permitted wider latitude under international law. The term does not apply to massacres planned in advance thousands of miles from the front. Accordingly, Truman never argued that destroying Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a “military necessity.” (2) While international law did not positively outlaw the aerial bombardment of cities during World War II, thus opening a small technical loophole at Nuremberg for Reich air minister Hermann Goring, the universal prohibition against civilian massacres surely extended to rational atrocities like Hiroshima and Nagasaki, especially by the flexible judicial standards in play at Nuremberg. Would the notorious slaughter of 660 French villagers in Oradour in June 1944 have been less criminal if it had been carried out by the Luftwaffe rather than the 2nd SS Panzer Division?

And here’s a snippet from Ronald Radosh’s opening argument, for the “defense”:

The essence of Nobile’s case is based on a highly legalistic and a-historical citation of Article 6 of The Nuremburg Charter. Nobile takes it further, by extending the description of war criminal to Truman’s entire atomic cabinet, his chain of command, the pilots on the Enola Gay, and all those politicians who through the years have praised what he calls “the atrocities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” His cast of characters is thoroughly bipartisan, exempting no one except Mr. Nobile himself—and we are never sure that as an American citizen, whether or not he is also guilty. Certainly, those historians who reach a judgment different than the one he reaches are also included—his list includes such scholars of distinction as Stephen Ambrose, Iris Chang, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., etc. etc. etc. I now give Mr. Nobile permission in advance to include my name among the above. I would welcome being among such august company—and no, I do not believe that anyone on his list is guilty of covering up actual crimes of war.

Rather than follow the technique used by Mr. Nobile, I would like to attempt to deal with the questions he raises in another way. To be guilty of a war crime, President Truman and his associates would indeed, as Nobile writes, have had to conspire “to commit two of the most fiendish slaughters in the annals of war.” The purpose, in other words, would have had to be a desire to use the A-bomb in order to produce precisely such an end–“fiendish slaughter”–and not to force the Japanese military to make peace or save even more American and Japanese lives than died as a result of the bombing.

[snip]

Let us first take up the question of whether or not using the A-bomb on Japan was militarily necessary. Was Japan a besieged nation yearning for peace, lying prostrate at the feet of the United States? From reading Nobile and the revisionist historians, one certainly gets this impression that the answer to the first is no, and the second yes. There are two related questions to consider in order to actually answer the question. The first is what actual amount of casualties did Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe would occur if the A-bomb was not used. The second is whether the Japanese government would have agreed to end the war if the A-bomb had not been dropped.

On both of these fundamental questions, the evidence indicates that Nobile and the revisionists have not made a strong case. Indeed, the very latest scholarship has all but demolished the revisionist accounts on which Nobile depends. Writing in the Pacific Historical Review in November 1998, Sadao Asada offered his own thoroughly researched answer in his seminal article, “The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan‘s Decision to Surrender–A Reconsideration.” His article reveals that the bomb and only the bomb galvanized Japan‘s peace party to take actions necessary to terminate the Pacific War. What he accomplishes in a virtual tour de force is to correlate the day by day decisions of the Japanese government from August 6th through the 14th in the context of how the use of the A-bomb worked to produce acceptance of the Potsdam terms of surrender. His criticism, that to the Japanese historians, “the sense of victimization takes precedence over historical analysis,” may be extended as well to Mr. Nobile, for whom the desire to brand those who saw a need to use the bomb as a group of war criminals equally takes precedence over the task of the historian.

The case — which became very heated, as you can see — was submitted to a jury of ten historians. The verdict: 2 guilty, 7 not guilty, 1 undecided.

Readers?

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Seamus
Seamus

Courtesy of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation: The Hiroshima Myth by John V. Denson, August 2, 2006 Every year during the first two weeks of August the mass news media and many politicians at the national level trot out the “patriotic” political myth that the dropping of the two atomic bombs on Japan in August of 1945 caused them to surrender, and thereby saved the lives of anywhere from five hundred thousand to one million American soldiers, who did not have to invade the islands. Opinion polls over the last fifty years show that American citizens overwhelmingly (between 80 and 90%) believe this false history which, of course, makes them feel better about killing hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians (mostly women and children) and saving American lives to accomplish the ending of the war. The best book, in my opinion, to explode this myth is The Decision to Use the Bomb by Gar Alperovitz, because it not only explains the real reasons the bombs were dropped, but also gives a detailed history of how and why the myth was created that this slaughter of innocent civilians was justified, and therefore morally acceptable. The essential problem starts with President Franklin… Read more »

Marty Lederman
Marty Lederman

A legal question from an outsider to this neck of international law. Please excuse me if the answer is obvious or well-known: For purposes of the question, please assume that the standard historical account is true — i.e., that Truman truly believed that bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki would bring a much quicker end to the war. (I’m not arguing that it’s true, or that Alperovitz was wrong — merely assuming it for purposes of argument.) If so, would anything in international law circa 1945, esp. the Hague Conventions, nevertheless have prohibited the bombings? What about Dresden? More to the point, perhaps, this is at the heart of my question: What’s law got to do with it? Or: What did law have to do with it, if anything? At the time, was there any serious consideration, inside governemnt or otherwise, about the legality (as opposed to the morality and/or strategic importance) of the bombing? Did the U.S. ever publicly make a case for why the bombing was consistent with international law? Did the President ever (publicly or privately) disclaim any obligations to act in conformity with treaty law or the customary laws of war? Thanks in advance.

Peggy McGuinness

Marty– An incomplete answer, but my recollection of the account of Truman’s decision making (granted, from the McCollough biography, which I understand other Truman scholars have taken issue with) is that he saw the bomb as a weapon of war to be used consistently with the laws of war. I am not aware of any contemporaneous public statements to that effect (it was a secret weapon, after all), but Truman’s private deliberations indicated his belief in the bomb’s legality and, more specifically, its proportionality if used for military purposes. I would be shocked to find Truman would have made any statements, publicly or privately, that the “laws of war” did not apply to him or the actions of the US. That said, it is clear from Truman’s diary and his subsequent statements that it was primarily a political and strategic decision. I defer to others with more intimate knowledge of the views of others inside the government — Stimson, Eisenhower, Bradley, etc. — on their views of the legality question. In my view, it is extraordinarily difficult, ex post, to determine what a contemporaneous legal analysis should have concluded regarding the Hague guidelines. But given that the long-term effects of… Read more »

Steve Vladeck
Steve Vladeck

I’ve always wondered about the distinction between Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If I remember the history right, the Japanese military casualties in Hiroshima were in the 1000s, whereas there were something like 184 for Nagasaki (again, this might be wrong; it’s just my recollection).

If that’s true, I wonder if, to the extent law has anything to do with it, there’s an inherent proportionality question here? If so, it seems like it’s a lot easier to “defend” the bombing of Hiroshima as a military action than the bombing of Nagasaki, no?

Francis Franze-Nakamura
Francis Franze-Nakamura

Marty, I am not, by any means, a specialist in this area. However, here are a few hurried and incomplete points that I hope other readers will supplement or correct: 1. For the purposes of analyzing the legality of United State’s official justification for attacking Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is of limited use to look at the “standard historical account” as portrayed by biographers or in primary sources such as Truman’s diary. Instead, it is necessary to look at official declarations by top U.S. officials. Perhaps the most important official public declaration was made by Truman on August 9, 1945 in a radio address where he advanced there central arguments in defense of the attack on Hiroshima [I couldn’t find the whole text readily on the internet but there are some key excerpts at http://www.doug-long.com/hst.htm%5D: T1: The U.S. tried to avoid the unnecessary civilian losses. (“The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians. But that attack is only a warning of things to come. If Japan does not surrender, bombs will have to be… Read more »

Francis Franze-Nakamura
Francis Franze-Nakamura

Steve, Interesting point. If you buy my arguments above, the law circa 1945 does have something to do with assessing the legality of the attack. In regards to proportionality, I don’t think there is or was a clear calculus that we can employ. The amount of forces in the area is relevant as you point out. But perhaps, more so, is the fact that Hiroshima was a significant manufacturing facility. I think everyone will agree that it is difficult to put a quantitative value on all these and other military assets that existed in the cities. Nevertheless, the position I attempt to advance above is that the necessity defense, and the proportionality analysis upon which it relies, is not properly invoked. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks were illegal precisely because they targeted civilians and thereby violated the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks. I don’t think the defense of necessity can overcome this as the killing or terrorizing of civilians is not a legitimate military objective. And, I fail to see any other direct and immediate military advantage that would justify such an attack. (In the alternative, I would argue to you that the loss of civilian lives and homes was clearly… Read more »

Marty Lederman
Marty Lederman

Thank you, Francis — that’s enormously helpful. Just a follow-up: Besides the intimations about international law that might be secreted in Truman’s radio address, did the U.S. ever specifically explain why the bombings complied with international law — especially treaty obligations, such as the Hague Convention, although I’m interested in customary law , too — or, alternatively, why international law was not binding or applicable? If there were no such public discussions, is there record of any internal legal analysis within the Executive branch?

Thanks again.

Francis Franze-Nakamura
Francis Franze-Nakamura

Marty, I don’t recall any public statements or memos about Hiroshima or Nagasaki that discuss treaty obligations explicitly. But, that certainly does not mean they do not exist. The intimations about customary norms, however, can be found in a variety of places. Here are two that come immediately to mind: – The Franck Committee issued a report that tried to encourage the government’s targeting committee to recommend attacking a remote area. The Franck Committee emphasized that the bomb was an indiscriminate weapon that would be condemned by the international community and would hinder the ability of the US to negotiate future treaties. (See http://www.dannen.com/decision/franck.html) The Secretary of War was a member of the targeting committee and was clearly aware of the report. And, he discusses the decision to reject the report in an article he published in Harper’s in 1947. – Leading military officials publicly condemned the attack as being against the laws of war or as being unnecessary. An engaging account of the reaction of the military and executive branch officials is set forth in Ronald Takaki’s Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb. [Note: it’s been some time since I’ve read Takaki’s book and he may identify some… Read more »

Nom
Nom

Those who argue that Japan was willing to surrender even absent an atomic bombing fail to appreciate the evidence staring them in the face opposing such a position: the fact that EVEN AFTER ONE OF THEIR CITIES WAS NUKED, they failed to surrender! It required an additional nuke to persuade the suicidal fanatics of Imperial Japan to surrender. Both of my grandafthers fought in the PAcific in WWII (one in the Marine Corps, one in bombers in the Army Air Corps) and were witnesses to the Japanese willingness to fight til the death of the last man. Death was always preferable to surrender. From wikipedia’s entry on the Battle of Iwo Jima: “Most Japanese soldiers fought to the death. On the night of 25 March, a 300-man Japanese force launched a vicious final counterattack in the vicinity of Airfield Number 2. Army pilots, Seabees and Marines of the 5th Pioneer Battalion and 28th Marines fought the fanatical Japanese force till morning but suffered heavy casualties — more than 100 killed and another 200 American wounded. Nearly all of the Japanese force was killed in the battle [1]. Of over 21,700 defenders, only just over a 200 were taken prisoner (less… Read more »