29 Jun Supreme Court Holds Military Commissions Invalid
The Supreme Court today issued its decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and ruled that the military commissions were invalid. The decision is available here. Justice Stevens wrote the 5-3 opinion and was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and in part Justice Kennedy. Justices Kennedy and Breyer wrote separate opinions. Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia dissented and wrote separate dissenting opinions. Chief Justice Roberts took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Here is a key excerpt of the case holding that the Geneva Conventions apply to the conflict with Al Qaeda (Justice Kennedy did not join Section VI.iv and it therefore is identified as an opinion of Justice Stevens rather than the opinion of the Court):
VI. ii.The conflict with al Qaeda is not, according to the Government, a conflict to which the full protections afforded detainees under the 1949 Geneva Conventions apply because Article 2 of those Conventions (which appears in all four Conventions) renders the full protections applicable only to “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties.” 6 U. S. T., at 3318. Since Hamdan was captured and detained incident to the conflict with al Qaeda and not the conflict with the Taliban, and since al Qaeda, unlike Afghanistan, is not a “High Contracting Party”-i.e., a signatory of the Conventions, the protections of those Conventions are not, it is argued, applicable to Hamdan.
We need not decide the merits of this argument because there is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions that applies here even if the relevant conflict is not one between signatories. Article 3, often referred to as Common Article 3 because, like Article 2, it appears in all four Geneva Conventions, provides that in a “conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,” certain provisions protecting “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by … detention.” Id., at 3318. One such provision prohibits “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” ….
iii.
Common Article 3, then, is applicable here and, as indicated above, requires that Hamdan be tried by a “regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”… At a minimum, a military commission “can be ‘regularly constituted’ by the standards of our military justice system only if some practical need explains deviations from court-martial practice.”…
iv.
Inextricably intertwined with the question of regular constitution is the evaluation of the procedures governing the tribunal and whether they afford “all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” 6 U. S. T., at 3320 (Art. 3, ¶ 1(d)). Like the phrase “regularly constituted court,” this phrase is not defined in the text of the Geneva Conventions. But it must be understood to incorporate at least the barest of those trial protections that have been recognized by customary international law. Many of these are described in Article 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, adopted in 1977 (Protocol I). Although the United States declined to ratify Protocol I, its objections were not to Article 75 thereof. Indeed, it appears that the Government “regard[s] the provisions of Article 75 as an articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of an enemy are entitled.”…
We agree with Justice Kennedy that the procedures adopted to try Hamdan deviate from those governing courts-martial in ways not justified by any “evident practical need,” post, at 11, and for that reason, at least, fail to afford the requisite guarantees. See post, at 8, 11-17. We add only that, as noted in Part VI-A, supra, various provisions of Commission Order No. 1 dispense with the principles, articulated in Article 75 and indisputably part of the customary international law, that an accused must, absent disruptive conduct or consent, be present for his trial and must be privy to the evidence against him. See § § 6(B)(3), (D). That the Government has a compelling interest in denying Hamdan access to certain sensitive information is not doubted. Cf. post, at 47-48 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But, at least absent express statutory provision to the contrary, information used to convict a person of a crime must be disclosed to him.
v.
Common Article 3 obviously tolerates a great degree of flexibility in trying individuals captured during armed conflict; its requirements are general ones, crafted to accommodate a wide variety of legal systems. But requirements they are nonetheless. The commission that the President has convened to try Hamdan does not meet those requirements.
More on the decision later today.
I am not sure I understand. Why does Common Article 3 apply? The conflict in which Hamdan was captured was located where? Was it in Iraq, Afghanistan, or somewhere else? In any case, would it matter? Should the analysis depend on which country’s territory an un-uniformed, allegedly armed hostile combatant is captured in? Shouldn’t it instead depend solely on the character of the conflict (international; check) and that the capturing party is a signatory?
Eh Nonymous,
Is your question prescriptive or normative? The analysis, it seems to me, “should” track the language of Article 3. And as the Court explained, Article 3 applies to conflicts “not of an international character occurring in the territory of [a signatory].” So, yes, it does matter where a combatant is captured and detained. The Government argued that the conflict with Al Queda is “international” in scope, but the Court held that “interenational” in this context means, literally, “between nations.” Justice Thomas is the only Justice dissenting on this point, and his argument is only that both the President’s and Hamdan’s construction of the “not of international character” language are “reasonable” and that the Court should therefore defer to the President.
Answer: Hamdan was captured in Afghanistan. That is how the issue arose. The government took the position that by the plain language of common article 3, it cannot apply to an armed conflict outside the territory of the United States. Thus, because the conflict with Al Qaeda was “international” in scope, common article 3 did not apply. Nor did the rest of the Conventions apply (like the prisoner of war provisions) because they only apply to state v. state conflicts in accordance with common article 2. This interpretation is what created the legal “black hole” for the armed conflict with Al Qaeda. Not covered by common article 2 because not a state; not covered by common article 3 because although the conflict was “non-international” within the meaning of the law of war (not between states), it has “inernational” scope. The Court rejected this very narrow interpretation, and instead followed the long understood logic of the Conventions. Question 1: is it an armed conflict: if yes, SOME law of war applies. Question 2: is it an “international armed conflict” (between states). If yes, ALL the law of war applies; IF NO, then revert to the baseline standard of common article 3… Read more »
Prof. Corn states it succinctly. My quetion is how can Afghanistan possibly be an non-international armed conflict when it is so obviously a an armed occupation under art. 2 even if it isn’t considered to be an armed conflict under art. 2? And if the GWOY is really a war, is a bank robery a war? If not, why not?
I think the court was simply establishing the bottom line here because the particular issue in this case didn’t require they go further. I’m thinking that In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases may now bring all of this front and center… And that’s the big question now: how does Hamdan affect Judge Green’s D.D.C. opinion?
As I noted in the post, there is certainly much debate on the proposition that the conflict with al Qaeda is a distinct “armed conflict.” Many experts have adopted your position – that you can’t dissect that conflict with al Qaeda from the armed conflict with Afghanistan, and therefore al Qaeda detainees are either civilians protected by GC IV, or militia members associated with the Taliban forces protected by GC III. I think it is correct that this issue was never presented to the Court. However, it still strikes me as profound that the Court endorsed the distinct armed conflict approach of the administration. One thing I feel pretty confident about – DOD and DOS will hold strong and fast to this position, even if there is a leadership change. It is at the core of much of the analysis related to the GWOT. DOD has been ordered to engage al Qaeda as a military enemy, and the “armed conflict” framework is therefore essential. The “obligation avoidance” mentality is what led to the absurd assertion that although the fight was an “armed conflict” for purposes of the “authorities” of war, because it was not confined to the territory of the… Read more »