John Bolton’s Role in SC Resolution 1672

The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1672 yesterday, imposing sanctions yesterday on four Sudanese considered responsible for the the atrocities in Darfur. The Resolution passed 12-0, with China, Russia and Qatar abstaining on the ground that sanctions would disrupt the reconciliation process.

The sanctioned individuals are Major General Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan, commander of the Western Military Region for the Sudanese Armed Forces; Sheik Musa Hilal, paramount chief of the Jalul Tribe in North Darfur; Adam Yacub Shant, a commander in the Sudanese Liberation Army , and Gabril Abdul Kareem Badri, a member of the Movement for Reform and Development.

Resolution 1672 was introduced by John Bolton, who is trumpeting it as a major achievement for the Security Council and the U.S.:

U.S. Ambassador John Bolton said that the sanctions “demonstrate that the Security Council is serious in its effort to restore peace and security in the region and that, far from interfering in the peace process in Abuja, it will strengthen that process.”

“It should indicate to all the parties in the conflict in Darfur we are determined to bring this to a peaceful resolution and restore peace and security for the people of Darfur, who have been most adversely affected by the conflict,” the ambassador said.

Bolton, who is the chief U.S. envoy to the United Nations, added that the United States is prepared to press ahead with sanctions against others in Darfur as sufficient evidence becomes available. “There is a wide variety of possibilities for sanctions and we do intend to pursue them vigorously,” he said.

Resolution 1672 is a step forward, but it’s a small one. Although rebel groups like the SLA and JEM are clearly responsible for some of the atrocities in Darfur, the overwhelming majority were committed by government forces and the Janjaweed. Here’s a snippet from the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur’s report:

632. The Commission finds that large scale destruction of villages in Darfur has been deliberately caused, by and large, by the Janjaweed during attacks, independently or in combination with Government forces. Even though in most of the incidents the Government may not have participated in the destruction, their complicity in the attacks during which the destruction was conducted and their presence at the scene of destruction are sufficient to make them jointly responsible for the destruction. There was no military necessity for the destruction and devastation caused. The targets of destruction during the attacks under discussion were exclusively civilian objects. The destruction of so many civilian villages is clearly a violation of international human rights law and international humanitarian law and amounts to a very serious war crime.

633. The Commission considers that there is a consistent and reliable body of material which tends to show that numerous murders of civilians not taking part in the hostilities were committed both by the Government of the the Sudan and the Janjaweed. It is undeniable that mass killing occurred in Darfur and that the killings were perpetrated by the Government forces and the Janjaweed in a climate of total impunity and even encouragement to commit serious crimes against a selected part of the civilian population. The large number of killings, the apparent pattern of killing and the participation of officials or authorities are amongst the factors that lead the Commission to the conclusion that killings were conducted in both a widespread and systematic manner. The mass killing of civilians in Darfur is therefore likely to amount to a crime against humanity.

Why weren’t high-level government officials included on the sanctions list? Because of John Bolton, whose public words once again conceal — and distort — his private actions. Here’s Mark Leon Goldberg, writing a few days before the vote:

If you want to understand the how the Bush administration can score political points while taking a minimalist approach to the crisis in Darfur, observe how the press reacts to Ambassador John Bolton’s forthcoming disclosure of the names of four individuals slated for Security Council sanctions for their role in the atrocities there. As I write, the Security Council is discussing these sanctions, and by disclosing these names Bolton is trying to force Russia and China into going public with their objections. Says Bolton today, “These are people who are involved in atrocities and killing people and turning people into refugees.”

What Bolton will likely not say is that of those four, only one is a Sudanese government official, and a mid-level official at that. He will not advertise that at American insistence the list of four was whittled down from a list of eight names generated by the UK. According to reports two weeks ago, when the US saw the list of names circulated by the UK, they objected to the inclusion of Sudanese government officials on the list. Obviously frustrated by the administration’s behavior, someone leaked this embarrassing anecdote to the press, so Bolton’s team was forced back to the negotiating table, and acceded to the one mid-level official.

To great fanfare this afternoon, Bolton will paint the Chinese and Russians as the real obstructionists here, which to a certain degree they are. But the Bush administration is also responsible for failing to hold any senior member of the Sudanese regime accountable for their role in the genocide.

It is reasonable to wonder why the U.S. would oppose sanctioning the officials who are most responsible for the atrocities in Darfur. A possible answer is one we’ve heard so many times before — to protect a U.S. intelligence asset, no matter how dirty his hands. Goldberg again:

What I imagine happened—and this is pure speculation—is that the original British list of eight included Sallah Gosh, a senior Khartoum official and US intelligence asset. Instead of objecting to Gosh on his own, which if made public would have been embarrassing to the administration, the US objected to naming any senior members of the regime, claiming that the Council needs to work with, rather than against, the regime to secure peace in Darfur. This logic has been a consistent feature of one strain of US policy towards Sudan, and it may have been summoned opportunistically in an effort to thwart punitive action against Gosh.

The politics of expediency — and the Darfurians are once again the losers.