Search: Complementarity SAIF GADDAFI

...if it attributes al-Senussi’s lack of counsel to the “security situation,” therefore, PTC I has absolutely no reason to accept Libya’s assertions that it will be able to provide al-Senussi with counsel prior to trial. And that, of course, is the problem with PTC I’s new “at the time of the admissibility decision” test for complementarity, which I criticized in my previous post. Al-Senussi’s lack of counsel may not threaten his prosecution right now — but it eventually will. And that is true regardless of whether al-Senussi’s lack of counsel...

...ILC’s work as duplicative and redundant as crimes against humanity is already within the mandate of the ICC. Malaysia based its argument on the understanding that the member States of the Rome Statute have an obligation to domesticate the crimes in their jurisdictions in furtherance of the complementarity principle. Further, the replication of the definition of CAH from the Rome Statute to the Draft Articles was flagged as problematic. (pp. 43 – 44, 129, 2016 Verbatim Record) China questioned the relevance and need for a specialised convention and called out...

...of the Court”; (3) admissibility, which focuses on gravity and complementarity; and (4) interests of justice, whether the OTP should decline to proceed despite jurisdiction and admissibility. The OTP opened its investigation into the situation in Afghanistan in January 2007. Yet only now — nearly seven years later — has the OTP concluded that there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes were committed there. And what are those crimes? Here is a snippet from the report: 23. Killings: According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (“UNAMA”),...

...to consist of an entirely new regime, national trials could become vengeful affairs— overzealous prosecutions lacking due process—such as Saddam Hussein’s trial before the Iraqi High Tribunal. If there actually were to be future credible national trials, the referral would have done no harm (it would not supplant good faith national investigations and prosecutions under the “complementarity” provisions of Rome Statute article 17), and in fact could provide incentive for holding national trials. As in all referrals, the referral would be of the “situation” in Syria , so would not...

...persons unless the Pre-Trial Chamber, on the application of the Prosecutor, decides to authorize the investigation. Notice the logical and temporal structure of Art. 18(2). The provision is triggered whenever a notified state asks the OTP to defer its investigation on complementarity grounds. When the OTP receives such a request, the default position is that the OTP “shall defer” to the state’s request. The only way the OTP can avoid deferring is to ask the PTC to authorize the investigation. If the PTC grants the OTP’s request, the investigation can...

...less able to divest the ICC of jurisdiction over Bashir and the others pursuant to the principle of complementarity: Last year the Sudanese government appointed a special prosecutor Nimr Ibrahim Mohamed to look in the Darfur abuses committed since 2003 and promised to bring Ali Kushayb, an alleged Janjaweed militia leader wanted by the ICC, before court. However, to date Kushayb has not been prosecuted and an attempt by the special prosecutor to probe the governor of South Kordofan Ahmed Haroun, also wanted by the ICC, was blocked by the...

...Statute. These include duties vis-à-vis States Parties which, if it had not withdrawn, would have otherwise arisen for the State in question on account of the Court’s exercise of its complementary jurisdiction in respect of the crimes over which that State would normally exercise jurisdiction. The ‘legal situation’ in connection with the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction encompasses, among others, the State Party’s duties to submit oneself to the ICC’s scrutiny as part of the complementarity analysis and to its admissibility determinations, as well as the duty to accept any prospective...

...African states as victims of a rigged international system. As an IR scholar, I appreciate that the book departs from the premise that international justice is ‘inherently and inextricably political’. By taking power seriously, Ba makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the motivations of states in their interactions with the ICC. He advances the well-rehearsed theoretical arguments on topics including complementarity, heads-of-state immunity and state compliance with international law by using empirical evidence from a plethora of case studies to test how the theory works in practice. Reading...

...that need to be adjudicated internationally at the ICC (or elsewhere). Indeed, one of the most interesting developments in international criminal law has been the elaboration of a fairly clear framework for the elaboration of a set of jurisdictional principles – complementarity, gravity, the widespread or systematic nature of the harm, the victim or the harm caused some specific damage to an international interest (i.e., attacks on UN peacekeepers), the shocking nature of the harm, etc. – to sift cases properly before international criminal courts from those properly tried elsewhere....

...example by the US State Department, Human Rights Watch, and the U.N. Panel of Experts on Libya. It remains to be seen if these investigative efforts will lead to concrete charges in the form of an arrest warrant. Yet, trafficking in persons may be more readily prosecuted as an international crime domestically, in states that have the legal machinery to do so. One such state is Uganda – a state that has been to the forefront of complementarity initiatives. It has domesticated the Rome Statute and created a specialized International...

...make the law, including the capacity to delegate its jurisdiction to the ICC. (OTP Request, para. 185) Consequently, the Prosecutor herself concluded that the Oslo Accord are “not a question that affects the Court’s jurisdiction.” Yet, she acknowledged that this might become “an issue of cooperation or complementarity.” (Ibid., para. 186) Accordingly, although the Oslo Accords – as ‘special agreement’ – might affect the enforcement jurisdiction of the occupied State (Palestine). Nevertheless, it cannot alter its prescriptive jurisdiction. i.e. the ability to delegate the exercises of its criminal jurisdiction to...

...democratic rights. In this light, it is worth looking at the rise of international adjudication in the post-Cold-War world along with the increasing attention to the problem of weak and failed states. The decisions of international adjudicators in the international criminal law and human rights law areas often respond directly to political and legal institutional failures or gaps at the level of the state. The authority of international adjudicators thus may be seen as relative to that of other institutions. This is explicitly contemplated by the conception of “complementarity” that...