Search: self-defense

have at times been so confusing. The inapplicability of self-defense to LOAC is aptly encapsulated by Professor Ohlin vis-à-vis its interplay with the combatant’s privilege: the latter trumps the former, thereby rendering reliance upon it both unnecessary and self-defeating. Claiming self-defense in the face of criminal or disciplinary proceedings is essentially an excuse, but a privileged combatant who has exercised lethal force in compliance with LOAC has no need for vindication. In fact, he or she may be in line for a medal. Yet, I am left wondering whether the...

not neutral, so 4) I will take out your air defense systems. Best, Ben Jordan Agreed that "unwilling or unable" is not a limitation of the inherent right of self or collective self-defense and would only be relevant if a minority viewpoint regarding "anticipatory" self-defense could be accepted despite the express limitation of whatever had been self-defense under CIL in Article 51 of the UN Charter, e.g., "if an armed attack occurs." Hey Ben: the Assad regime could ask Iran to provide "boots on the ground" as part of collective...

scholars. That’s it. Not a US case. Not a foreign case. Not an international case. Not a ratio. Not an obiter. Nothing. According to Yoo, CIA interrogators can claim self-defense because two criminal-law scholars believe that traditional self-defense doctrine is inadequate in the post-9/11 era. Again, the dishonesty of Yoo’s legal “analysis” is staggering. I am glad that Kopel is trying to rekindle debate over necessity and self-defense. Perhaps this time we can bury the mistaken idea that a CIA interrogator could rely on those defenses once and for all....

...of CONTROL. Anyway, assuming that, in principle, Colombia can respond to an attack by FARC from Ecuador by entering Ecuador itself, the second problem with this case is anticipatory self-defense. As far as I can tell, Colombia is not making the same preventative self-defense argument that Bush did in the National Security Strategy. On the contrary, its legal argument is the much more classical case of anticipatory or interceptive self-defense in relation to an attack which is imminent, or is an ongoing process. Think, for example, of the Caroline incident....

...stated that: Defendants’ conduct can most generously be characterized as preventive self-defense, a concept that finds no support in state or federal law. Preventive self-defense is an offensive concept, properly understood to constitute aggression, and is, in fact, the opposite of defense. To endorse preventive self-defense in the prison context would be to transform correction institutions into combat zones, in which legal sanction is granted to inmates who would sooner kill a potential enemy than seek assistance from the prison administration. “Under the law of the jungle a good offense...

the civilian. Put another way, combatants “have the right to participate directly in hostilities.” But the soldier claims that she and the civilian were not participating directly in hostilities when one attacked and the other defended. Finally, combatant immunity applies to acts that are governed but not prohibited by the law of armed conflict. Again, the gist of the soldier’s defense is that her act of self-defense was not governed by the law of armed conflict at all. What follows? The contributors focus their discussion on the elements of self-defense...

...-- non-state actor armed attacks against Canada could justify appropriate measures of self-defense without U.S. consent and when the U.S. was not at war with Canada and when there was no attribution or imputation to the U.S. -- the debate was about the appropriate test for actual self-defense method uses. see http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520717 Yes, there is no unwilling or unable test that would allow preemptive self-defense before a process of armed attacks begin, but there is also no unwilling or unable limitation of the right to engage non-state actors once the...

...ground justifying the use of drone warfare and targeted killing, as well as setting rules for its conduct, is the international law of self defense. I maintain, and certainly continue to maintain, that there are circumstances in which the use of targeted killing can and as a proper legal description should be understood to be the use of force as a lawful act of self defense even though it takes place outside of an armed conflict, and even though that use itself does not create an armed conflict. It seems...

...within the orbit of international law. It is thus important to understand how the NPR captures the US current stance on the possibility of using nuclear weapons in self-defense where an armed attack has not yet occurred, particularly in light of deteriorating relations between the US and North Korea, as well as Russia’s nuclear weapons modernization efforts. We argue that the NPR is not compliant with international law standards on self-defense. The NPR: Brief Overview The NPR is a legislatively-mandated review, produced by the Secretary of Defense, that establishes US...

...may use force in self-defense only “if an armed attack occurs.” Therefore, Iran’s shooting down of the Global Hawk would be lawful, under the rules of the jus ad bellum, only if the drone had entered Iranian airspace and if that act can be categorized as an armed attack. Indeed, it seems that Iran considered itself to be acting in self-defense. In a letter to the U.N. Security Council and the U.N. Secretary General, Iran declared that it “reserves its inherent right, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,...

the self-defense doctrine, but also justifies these attacks as an instance of preemptive self-defense. Indeed, my former boss Will Taft argued that, as much as one could see the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan as a reaction to an armed attack, it was also a case of preemptive self-defense given the imminent threat of harm from additional Al Qaeda attacks. Obviously, other states are much more skeptical about the availability of preemptive self-defense under the U.N. Charter. Still, you can see hints of such thinking in McCormack’s statements yesterday, when he...

always presumed a right of anticipatory self-defense that is significantly broader than the Webster test.” Berkowitz offers precisely one piece of evidence in support of that claim — a 1914 statement by Elihu Root, then a U.S. senator, at an ASIL conference. That’s it. Berkowitz does not even explain why, if the U.S. believed that the customary scope of self-defense extended well beyond Caroline‘s “imminence” standard, Webster would have specifically relied on that standard to criticize the British attack — which the British Foreign Minister later agreed was the correct...