Preparing for Trumpxit: Could a President Trump Withdraw the U.S. from International Treaties and Agreements?
As we face the first U.S. presidential debate tonight (on my home campus of Hofstra University!), the possibility of a President Trump seems more and more real. Although U.S. election analysts all make Hillary Clinton the favorite, most of them continue to give Trump a very realistic chance of winning on November 8. I am not a Trump supporter, but I think it would be irresponsible not to think seriously about the legal policy consequences of his election to the presidency. In particular, candidate Trump has promised or threatened to withdraw the U.S. from numerous international treaties and agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, the World Trade Organization, NATO, the U.S.- Japan Mutual Defense Treaty, the Paris Climate Change Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Deal (I am sure I am missing a few more). Unlike our friends in Britain who weren’t really planning for Brexit, I think those of us here in the U.S. should start planning, before it happens, for “Trumpxit.”
As an initial matter, we should consider to what extent a President Trump could unilaterally withdraw the U.S. from international treaties and agreements. I notice that most commentary, including this scary piece by Eric Posner in the NYT from this past spring, assume the President has this unilateral power. But I do not think this issue is not entirely settled as a matter of U.S. constitutional law.
In the 1979 decision Goldwater v. Carter, the U.S. Supreme Court dodged the question of whether a President could unilaterally terminate the U.S.-Republic of China (Taiwan) mutual defense treaty without consulting or getting the approval of the U.S. Senate by invoking the political question doctrine and (in a concurrence) the judicial ripeness doctrine. No U.S. court has, as far as I am aware, reached the merits of this question. I think scholars are somewhat divided, and historical practice is mixed.
President George W. Bush did set a precedent in favor of presidentialism, however, by withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 without getting the approval of the Senate and President Carter did likewise in the 1979 Taiwan defense treaty. It seems likely that the president does have unilateral authority to withdraw the U.S. from treaties which specify terms for withdrawal and which don’t require further alterations or changes to domestic U.S. law.
Defense Treaties/Military Alliances
This suggests that a President Trump could terminate NATO and the US-Japan Defense Treaty pursuant to those treaties’ withdrawal provisions. Interestingly, the NATO Treaty Article 13 specifies that “Any Party” can terminate their membership with one year’s notice. That notice must be sent to the U.S. Government. So I guess a President Trump could give himself a one year’s notice?
Because the issue has not been settled by the U.S. Supreme Court, another Goldwater v. Carter type lawsuit could be brought. It seems less likely that such a case would be dismissed on political question grounds given recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, but I think the smart money would be on a President Trump prevailing on the merits on a challenge to a presidential NATO or US-Japan Defense Treaty termination.
Nonbinding/Sole Executive Agreements
On the other end of the spectrum, I think there is no legal problem with a President Trump unilaterally withdrawing from the Paris Agreement or the JCPOA (aka the Iran Nuclear Deal). As I have argued in the past (here and here), both agreements are likely to be “nonbinding” political agreements, and can be terminated at the new President’s sole discretion. This would be true, even if the agreements were treated as binding international agreements, since both agreements have withdrawal provisions. Since the Senate or Congress never approved either agreement, there is no need to ask them for approval to terminate it either.
The hardest question here has to do with trade agreements like NAFTA and the WTO. Most commentary, including this paper by Gary Hufbauer, have assumed a President Trump could unilaterally terminate all trade agreements (see some dissenting views from Rob Howse here). Unlike the Paris agreement or the JCPOA, these are unquestionably binding agreements that are approved by Congress. But unlike a traditional arms control treaty like NATO, withdrawing from NAFTA or the WTO could require some meaningful changes to U.S. domestic law. Moreover, unlike a traditional treaty, the President engages in trade agreement negotiations under the “trade promotion” authority enacted by Congress prior to the conclusion of any trade agreement. In other words, the President could be understood to be negotiating pursuant to a delegated congressional power as opposed to under his inherent constitutional powers.
For instance, in the most recent version of the “fast track” enacted by Congress to allow President Obama to finalize the TPP, Section 103(b) states:
“[w]henever the President determines that one or more existing duties or other import restrictions of any foreign country or the United States are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the United States and that the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives of this title will be promoted thereby, the President—
(A) may enter into trade agreements with foreign countries before— (i) July 1, 2018…
(Emphasis added). This language means that there is at least a colorable argument in favor of requiring a President Trump to seek congressional approval before withdrawing from a trade agreement like NAFTA or the WTO. To be sure, both trade agreements have specific withdrawal provisions similar to those found in the NATO treaty. But the fact that the president is acting pursuant to his congressional authorized “trade promotion authority” suggests that Congress did not necessarily delegate the power of termination to the President alone.
Moreover, the implementing legislation for some trade agreements further suggests Congress has reserved some residual “termination” power. In Section 125 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, for instance, Congress may terminate U.S. participation in the WTO with a joint resolution of both Houses. This does not necessarily mean the U.S. is automatically out, but since the President can’t (under the terms of the law) join the WTO until Congress approves, presumably withdrawing that approval terminates U.S. participation. It is all somewhat uncertain, but again, I think there is colorable argument that a President Trump could not unilaterally withdraw the U.S. from the WTO, NAFTA and other trade agreements.
O O O
None of this may matter, of course, if we get a President Clinton instead. But as the possibility of a President Trump gets closer to reality, we need to start thinking about the legal authority he would have to fulfill his campaign promises, and the limits (if any) on that authority,