As Bill Schabas noted in his recent post, the Comoros referral raises interesting questions concerning the Pre-Trial Chamber’s power to review a decision by the OTP not to open a full investigation into a situation. Most people who don’t keep a copy of the Rome Statute in their back pocket probably believe that the OTP has complete discretion concerning such declinations. In fact, that is not the case. Here, in relevant part, is Art. 53 of the Rome Statute (emphasis mine):

Article 53Initiation of an investigation1.         The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether:

(a)     The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed;

(b)     The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and

(c)     Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.

If the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed and his or her determination is based solely on subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.

…

3.         (a)     At the request of the State making a referral under article 14 or the Security Council under article 13, paragraph (b), the Pre-Trial Chamber may review a decision of the Prosecutor under paragraph 1 or 2 not to proceed and may request the Prosecutor to reconsider that decision.

(b)     In addition, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, on its own initiative, review a decision of the Prosecutor not to proceed if it is based solely on paragraph 1 (c) or 2 (c). In such a case, the decision of the Prosecutor shall be effective only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.

It is clear that Comoros would have the right under Art. 53(3)(a) to ask the Pre-Trial Chamber to review a decision by the OTP not to open a full investigation into the attack on the flotilla. And that would be true regardless of the OTP’s rationale for the declination: (1) lack of evidence that the attack involved a crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction; (2) admissibility concerns — which would turn on whether crimes allegedly committed during the attack were adequately grave and, if so, whether Israel was willing and able to investigate and prosecute those crimes itself; or (3)  the interests of justice.

But here is where things get interesting. If Comoros asked the PTC to review a decision by the OTP not to investigate the attack on the flotilla, thereby triggering Art. 53(3)(a), the PTC would have only one remedy if it disagreed with the OTP’s assessment of the merits of the referral — to “request the Prosecutor to reconsider that decision.” It could not order the OTP to open a full investigation into the attack. So if the OTP reconsidered its decision and again concluded that a full investigation was not warranted, that would be the end of the story.

Art. 53(3)(b), by contrast, would appear to put the PTC in a much more powerful position…

This is very interesting. The Union of the Comoros, a state party to the Rome Statute since 2002, has formally referred Israel’s attack on the flotilla that included the MV Mavi Marmara to the ICC. The question I want to address in this post is whether the Court has jurisdiction over the flotilla attack. I think it’s clear that it does — although there is at least one important wrinkle in the analysis. But I also think it’s exceedingly unlikely the OPT will open a formal investigation into the attack.

In terms of jurisdiction, the critical provision in the Rome Statute is Art. 12, “Preconditions to Jurisdiction.” Article 12(2) provides as follows (emphasis mine):

In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:

(a)     The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft;

The bolded text is critical. The Court has jurisdiction over an international crime only if that crime was committed by a national of a state party to the Rome Statute or on the territory of a state party. Art. 12(a) makes clear, however, that a vessel registered to a state party qualifies as the territory of that state. According to the referral, the MV Mavi Marmara was registered to Comoros at the time of the attack, 31 May 2010. (Comoros provides documentation of registration in an appendix to its referral that is not available on the ICC website.) For purposes of jurisdiction, therefore, the MV Mavi Marmara does indeed qualify as Comoros territory. And that means Art. 12 is satisfied.

The wrinkle in the analysis is whether the attack on the MV Mavi Marmara qualifies as a “situation.” States are permitted to refer situations to the Court, not specific crimes. Here is Art. 14(1):

A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the commission of such crimes.

Is Comoros referring a situation to the Court? All of the situations currently being investigated by the OTP — Kenya, Libya, Cote D’Ivoire, etc. — are much broader than the situation being referred by Comoros. That said, the referral is not limited solely to the attack on the MV Mavi Marmara. As Comoros’ supporting documentation notes, one other ship in the attacked flotilla, the MV Sofia, was registered to a state party — Greece. Moreover, the referral suggests that Israel’s June 6 attack on the MV Rachel Corrie, which was registered to Cambodia, a state party, should also be included in the overall situation. (The referral tries to link the attack on the flotilla to the situation in Gaza, suggesting that the attack would be part of any situation referred to the Court by Palestine. That’s clever but irrelevant, at least at this point, because Palestine has not yet ratified the Rome Statute.)

In terms of the Rome Statute’s legal requirements, I think that Comoros has indeed referred a situation to the Court. Article 14(1) speaks of situations in which “one or more crimes… appear to have been committed,” suggesting that even one crime can, in the right circumstances, qualify as a situation. (An attack with a nuclear or chemical weapon, for example.) The limited scope of the situation being referred by Comoros, therefore, should not legally disqualify the referral.

In short, the ICC does indeed have jurisdiction over the attack on the flotilla (and the later attack on the MV Rachel Corrie), so the OTP would be well within its rights to open a formal investigation into the attack. The real question is whether the OTP will open an investigation. A full answer is beyond the scope of this post, but I think it’s exceedingly unlikely. Although the limited scope of the referred situation is not legally disqualifying, I think it significantly reduces the situation’s overall gravity. To begin with, it is not clear whether any international crimes were committed on the MV Sofia or the MV Rachel Corrie (readers should feel free to weigh in), so the referred “situation” may, in practice, be limited to crimes allegedly committed on the MV Mavi Marmara. I don’t want to minimize the tragedy of nine civilian deaths, and I am no fan of determining gravity by simply counting victims, but I think the OTP would have a difficult time justifying a decision to prioritize the flotilla attack over many of the other situations it is considering, such as Colombia, Georgia, or Afghanistan.

Moreover, and more fundamentally, it does not seem sensible for the OTP to investigate one isolated component of the much larger conflict between Israel and Palestine. If the OTP ever does investigate that conflict — which, as I’ve discussed before, I don’t think it should — it needs to address all of the potential crimes, both Israeli and Palestinian. And that, I think, is the fatal flaw in the Comoros referral: it is essentially asking the OTP to investigate crimes committed by only one side of the conflict, Israel. Even if Israel’s account of the attack on the flotilla is correct and the IDF killed the civilians in self-defense, the ICC would still not have jurisdiction over the civilians’ actions — it is not a war crime to attack a soldier (though it could, of course, be a domestic crime).

Finally, a plea to the media: please do not overstate the importance of the OTP’s “decision” to open a preliminary examination into the attack on the flotilla. As the ICC’s press release notes, the OTP is required to conduct such an examination into every state referral, regardless of merit. I have no doubt that the OTP takes state referrals more seriously than referrals from individuals and human-rights groups. But that does not mean, nor does it even suggest, that the OTP will decide to open a formal investigation into the flotilla attack. Indeed, for all the reasons mentioned in this post, I think that is exceedingly unlikely.

I have now had the opportunity to read both Judge van den Wyngaert’s request to be excused from the Kenyatta case and the Presidency’s decision to grant that request. There is no question that workload did indeed play a role in the Judge’s decision to withdraw. But it also seems clear that there was at least one other reason, as I will explain below.

To begin with, though, I want to apologize to anyone — especially the Judge! — who saw my post as an attack on Judge van den Wyngaert’s integrity. That was certainly not its intent; I have nothing but respect for the Judge. Indeed, I intended the post to praise the Judge for her willingness to challenge the prosecution’s conduct openly and in writing, while still questioning whether withdrawing from the case was a good idea or consistent with the ICC’s rules. Unfortunately, having re-read the post a few times, I can see that I was nowhere near clear enough in expressing my intent. I should have avoided talking about “convenient excuses” and the like. My apologies again to anyone who thought I was attacking the Judge.

Now, my thoughts in light of the newly-released documents. First, my (at least partial) misinterpretation of the Judge’s actions reflects an ongoing problem with the Court’s release of information to the public. Had the Court made the relevant documents available in a timely fashion, I would have written the post differently — and more importantly, the Kenyan press would have found it more difficult to further discredit the case against Kenyatta by drawing a connection that may not actually exist. All too often, though, critical documents are either never put on the ICC website or are uploaded days after decisions themselves attract attention. I can usually hunt down documents I need, whether through personal connections or by asking for them here on the blog. But too many others depend solely on the website. Something needs to be done.

Second, to echo David Koller’s comment to my previous post, I am a bit baffled by the idea that Judge van den Wyngaert was only temporarily assigned to the Trial Chamber in the Kenyatta case. Here is paragraph 2 of her request to be excused:

On 30 March 2012, I was requested to accept temporary assignment to Trial Chamber V, in view of the limited capacity of judges in the Trial Division, as the newly elected judges assigned to that Division had not yet been called to The Hague. I accepted this assignment on the clear understanding that it would be limited in time and only for the purposes of the preparation of the two Kenya trials.

I am not completely convinced that the Rome Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence allow such a temporary assignment. Art. 39(4) of the Rome Statute does provide that “[n]othing in this article shall… preclude the temporary attachment of judges from the Trial Division to the Pre-Trial Division or vice versa, if the Presidency considers that the efficient management of the Court’s workload so requires.” My guess, though, is that the drafters of Art. 39(4) assumed that PTC judges would be temporarily assigned to the TC for the duration of a particular case, not simply for part of it. I could be wrong about that and invite readers to weigh in. Regardless, such temporary assignments are a terrible idea — not only because the departure of a judge just before trial can prejudice one of the parties (as I still believe is the case regarding the defence in the Kenyatta case), but also because they actually waste judicial resources by requiring two different judges to familiarize themselves with the case.

Third, and most importantly, I still have to disagree with those who insist — in the comments to my previous post or via email — that Judge van den Wyngaert withdrew solely because of her workload. Two very cryptic statements in the Presidency’s decisions contradict that idea (emphasis added):

The Judge submits that her assignment to that Chamber was temporary, only for the purpose of the preparation of the two Kenya cases for trial. REDACTED.

[snip]

The Presidency, having considered the matter before it, finds the request to be well founded. In coming to this conclusion the Presidency took particular note of the workload and REDACTED of the Judge as described above.

The second statement in particular makes clear there is more to the Judge’s desire to withdraw than just workload. I have no idea what the other rationale might be — although it’s impossible not to speculate that it is indeed that the Judge does not trust the prosecution to conduct itself fairly in the Kenyatta case. (And no, that’s not a criticism of the Judge!)  Maybe it’s not; maybe the rationale is completely different. But once again we have an optics problem: I think the public has a right to know precisely why a judge who has been so openly critical of the prosecution in an important case wants to be excused from that case. And I fail to see what could possibly justify the Presidency’s decision to redact the additional rationale — with no explanation whatsoever.

We need answers, and we need them sooner rather than later.

For the procrastinators among us, here’s another friendly reminder about our New Voices Symposium coming up in July and August. As a recap, this July, we are planning to launch a new feature called New Voices: a two-month online symposium to run alongside our regular posts. Our goal is to give students, new practitioners and emerging scholars a chance to profile their work by providing a platform for fresh ideas that will hopefully stimulate discussion with our regular bloggers and commentators.

We invite submissions on any topic of international law from LL.M., Ph.D., and S.J.D. students as well as those in the early stages of their careers (e.g., post-docs, junior academics or early career practitioners within the first five years of finishing their final degree), anywhere in the world.

If you’re interested, please send a 200-word summary of your idea and your CV to opiniojurisblog [at] gmail [dot] com by May 1, 2013–that’s this coming Wednesday! If selected, we’ll let you know by mid-May. We’ll also let you know at that point when your post is scheduled to go online. Final submissions between 1000-1500 words will be required two weeks before publication for review, so at the earliest by mid-June.

If you have any questions, feel free to ask them in the comments or send us an e-mail at the address above.

Two years ago, I wrote a long post analyzing the most serious charge in Bradley Manning’s court martial — aiding the enemy, a violation of Art. 104 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and 10 USC 904. I claimed in the post that someone like Bill Keller, the Executive Editor of the New York Times during the WikiLeaks era, could not face similar charges, because the UCMJ applies only to soldiers.

I was wrong.

Here is the text of Art. 104 (my emphasis):

“Any person who—

(1) aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies, money, or other things; or

(2) without proper authority, knowingly harbors or protects or gives intelligence to or communicates or corresponds with or holds any intercourse with the enemy, either directly or indirectly; shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial or military commission may direct.”

The key here is “any person.” Such broad personal jurisdiction is very unusual among the UCMJ’s punitive articles; the only other ones that use it are Art. 83 (fraudulent enlistment in the armed forces) and Art. 106 (spying). All of the other punitive articles have more limited jurisdiction, applying only to “any person subject to this chapter” (such as solicitation, Art. 82) or “any member of the armed forces” (such as desertion, Art. 85). The difference is critical, because it means that a person does not have to be subject to the UCMJ to be subject to court-martial for aiding the enemy. Indeed, both Art. 104 and Art. 2 in the Manual for Courts Martial (MCM) are explicit on that point. Here is the MCM’s explanation of Art. 104 (emphasis added):

Scope of Article 104. This article denounces offenses by all persons whether or not otherwise subject to military law. Offenders may be tried by court-martial or by military commission.

And here is the MCM’s explanation of Art. 2 (emphasis added):

(1) Authority under the code. Article 2 lists classes of per­sons who are subject to the code. These include active duty personnel (Article 2(a)(1)); cadets, aviation cadets, and midship­ men (Article 2(a)(2)); certain retired personnel (Article 2(a)(4) and (5)); members of Reserve components not on active duty under some circumstances (Article 2(a)(3) and (6)); persons in the custody of the armed forces serving a sentence imposed by courtmartial (Article 2(a)(7)); and, under some circumstances, speci­fied categories of civilians (Article 2(a)(8), (9), (10), (11), and (12); see subsection (3) and (4) of this discussion). In addition, certain persons whose status as members of the armed forces or as persons otherwise subject to the code apparently has ended may, nevertheless, be amendable to trial by court-martial. See Article 3, 4, and 73. A person need not be subject to the code to be subject to trial by court-martial under Articles 83, 104, or 106.

There is no reason, then, why Bill Keller could not be court-martialed for aiding the enemy. And indeed, for all the reasons I discussed in my post two years ago, he is no less guilty of that crime than Bradley Manning. Here are the elements of aiding the enemy via communication:

(5) Communicating with the enemy.

(a) That the accused, without proper authority, communicated, corresponded, or held intercourse with the enemy, and;

(b) That the accused knew that the accused was communicating, corresponding, or holding intercourse with the enemy.

If Manning has aided the enemy, so has Bill Keller. The crux of the government’s argument is this (see Specification 1 on the charge sheet): (1) Manning gave classified documents to WikiLeaks; (2) Manning knew that WikiLeaks would publish the documents on the internet; (3) the “enemy” — basically al-Qaeda and its associated forces — had access to the documents on the internet; (4) Manning thus indirectly communicated with the enemy. That argument, however frightening, is unfortunately far from frivolous. The crime does not require any intention to communicate with the enemy, much less an intention to harm the United States; as the MCM commentary says,”the intent, content, and method of the communication, correspondence, or intercourse are immaterial.” Nor does the crime require proof that the enemy actually received the prohibited communication: “[t]he offense is complete the moment the communication, correspondence, or intercourse issues from the accused.”

The government’s argument obviously applies to Bill Keller no less than to Bradley Manning. Indeed, in one respect, the case against Keller is even stronger than the case against Manning. Manning “communicated with the enemy” indirectly: he gave the documents to WikiLeaks; he did not post them on the internet himself. Keller, by contrast, authorized the New York Times to post Manning’s documents on its website, where anyone — al-Qaeda included — could find it. His communication with the enemy was thus direct, not indirect.

To be clear, I am categorically opposed to prosecuting anyone, Bradley Manning or Bill Keller, for “aiding the enemy” in circumstances like these. It is impossible to overstate the chilling effect the government’s argument — that causing intelligence to be posted on the internet qualifies as communicating with the enemy — will have on media freedom. But there is not simply moral equivalence between Manning’s actions and the actions of the New York Times. There is legal equivalence, as well. So if Manning deserves to be court-martialed for aiding the enemy, Bill Keller should be in the dock with him.

Literally.

In the wake of Obama’s memorable statement, a number of bloggers have questioned whether the Boston bombings deserve to be labeled “terrorism.” Most of those bloggers — such as the excellent Ali Abuminah here – emphasize that many US definitions of terrorism require the violent act in question to be politically or ideologically motivated, which is still an open question with regard to the Tsarnaev brothers’ actions.

I’m sympathetic to this position — and I wholeheartedly agree with Abuminah’s observation that “acts of violence, especially mass shootings, carried out typically by white males, are immediately labeled as the acts of ‘disturbed individuals’ while the acts of a person identified as ‘Muslim’ are to be labeled ‘terrorism’ regardless of the facts.” But it is important to acknowledge that not all definitions of terrorism require a political or ideological motivation — including the one that is most relevant to the Boston bombings, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (“Terrorist Bombing Convention”), which is codified in the US Code at 18 USC 2332f. Here is the international definition:

1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility:

(a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or

(b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system, where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic loss.

And here is the US definition:

(a) Offenses -

(1) In general – Whoever unlawfully delivers, places, discharges, or detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, into, or against a place of public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation system, or an infrastructure facility -

(A) with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury,
or
(B) with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility, or system, where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic loss,

shall be punished as prescribed in subsection (c).

The Boston bombings clearly qualify as terrorism under either definition. There is also no question that the Terrorist Bombing Convention applies, because one of the victims of the bombings was a Chinese national. (The Convention excludes acts that take place in one state and involve only nationals of that state.) The US version is a bit more complicated, because 18 USC 2332f requires a bombing to have a substantial effect on foreign or interstate commerce if jurisdiction is predicated — as it would be here — on the fact that the bombing killing a foreign national. But I agree with Bobby Chesney that the bombings almost certainly do have the requisite effect.

Again, I think it’s unfortunate that the label “terrorism” is almost always reserved for violent acts committed by Muslims, even though domestic groups (from right-to-lifers to neo-Nazis) pose a much greater threat to Americans living in the US. But that doesn’t change the fact that setting off bombs in the middle of a marathon does indeed qualify as terrorism.

NOTE: I should add that, as a normative matter, we should restrict the term “terrorism” to violent acts that are politically or ideologically motivated. I think it is precisely the presence of such a motivation that distinguishes terrorism from “ordinary” criminality. Alas, the international community does not seem to agree, at least for certain kinds of weapons.

With the steady stream of posts on Kiobel in the past 24 hours, you may have lost track of it all. So here is a little insta-roudup with links to all the posts we’ve had so far (there’ll be more in the regular roundup on Saturday).

To start, you can find the opinions here.

Julian posted on Roberts’ opinion, Kennedy’s concurrence (as did Deborah) and Breyer’s concurrence. He also provided his quick take and discussed the end of universal civil jurisdiction. Looking at the future, Peter wrote on how human rights will survive Kiobel and Roger on the rise of transnational tort litigation.

We also have a series of guest posts by Thomas Lee, Anthony Colangelo, John Knox, Chimène Keitner, Mike Koehler, Alex Mills and Chris Whytock.

There is more to come, and remember, we welcome unsolicited submissions by young academics who wish to contribute to our insta-symposium.

And if you want to refresh your memory, the posts from our roundtable when Kiobel was reargued in October 2012 can be found here.

We have invited several academic luminaries to post here at Opinio Juris over the next few days about the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel. We also are going to try something new and invite young academics to submit guests posts for possible publication. We can’t guarantee we will publish every post submitted, but we would love to broaden the discussion to include new voices. So if you want to write a guest post for Opinio Juris about Kiobel of approximately 500 to 1500 words, please do so in the next couple days and send it to Jessica Dorsey and An Hertogen (their emails are linked to the right). Our editorial team will review the posts and publish as many as we deem appropriate.

Here is the bottom line of the Roberts’ opinion, which makes it sound like this whole ATS thing is really a simple application of Morrison v. National Australia Bank.

On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application. See Morrison, 561 U. S. ___ (slip op. at 17–24). Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices. If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be required.

It also makes clear that “mere corporate presence” would not be enough to trigger US territorial jurisdiction under the ATS.  I sense a new litigation front opening up.

Apparently, the answer is yes, according to Professor Jeremi Suri of the University of Texas writing in the New York Times:

The Korean crisis has now become a strategic threat to America’s core national interests. The best option is to destroy the North Korean missile on the ground before it is launched. The United States should use a precise airstrike to render the missile and its mobile launcher inoperable.

President Obama should state clearly and forthrightly that this is an act of self-defense in response to explicit threats from North Korea and clear evidence of a prepared weapon. He should give the leaders of South Korea, Japan, China and Taiwan advance notice before acting. And he should explain that this is a limited defensive strike on a military target — an operation that poses no threat to civilians — and that America does not intend to bring about regime change. The purpose is to neutralize a clear and present danger. That is all.

I am highly dubious about this action as a policy matter, but I think that such a strike would be legal as a “preemptive” act of self-defense under international law.  Even for those wedded to the possibly outdated Caroline principle, I think the various statements by North Korea (including denouncing the armistice and making specific threats against South Korea and the United States) and its act of moving its missile into launch position would satisfy the Caroline’s imminence requirement.  I think a surgical strike that targeted only the missile would satisfy the proportionality requirement.

I am somewhat skeptical of Prof. Suri’s assurance that this will actually improve the security situation in Korea and Secretary Kerry seems to be going in the opposite direction.  But I do think he is right in putting this option on the table.   In any event, legal concerns should not constrain U.S. actions here.

Pierre N. Leval, a well-respected judge who sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York, has published a full-scale no-holds-barred policy defense of the Alien Tort Statute in Foreign Affairs.   The essay, which is adapted from his lecture to the New York City Bar Association, offers the standard argument in favor of the Alien Tort Statute (it gives victims of human rights atrocities the possibility of justice and compensation).  And he offers a pre-rebuttal to a possibly negative ATS ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell: the fact that other countries do not permit similar civil suits does not mean the United States should also close its courthouse doors.  In fact, it is a good reason to keep them open.

But I found Judge Leval’s advice for foreign countries that might enact their own version of the ATS most interesting and revealing.

Human rights advocates should try to allay predictable objections to countries’ opening their courts. They should start by drafting proposed legislation with modest and realistic goals, building in limitations that may disappoint the most ardent activists but hugely increase the chances of success. For example, a proposed bill for a country should require the approval of the foreign ministry before each suit can proceed to trial and specify that a suit will be allowed only if the plaintiff has no access to just relief in the country of the defendant or in the country where the abuse occurred. The bill should also require a court to dismiss a suit when the defendant can show that the plaintiff has forum-shopped and has access to justice in a country far better suited to hear the dispute, on the condition that the defendant agrees to face trial in that other country’s courts. And it should require an initial showing of probable cause to stave off frivolous, politically motivated suits. Limitations such as these would do much to disarm or convert opponents.

I agree!  In fact, any law allowing for civil suits to enforce universal norms must have these kinds of political and foreign policy safeguards. And critics of the ATS in the United States have repeatedly noted that such safeguards do not really exist in the expansive and textually-unsupported interpretation of the ATS first developed by judges on Judge Leval’s court. Put another way, it is hard to imagine that a new bill in the U.S. Congress creating universal civil jurisdiction would pass without similar limitations.  So why should the courts feel comfortable giving the ATS such a widely expansive role if neither Congress nor any foreign legislature would ever enact such a law if given a choice?

Are you an international law student or a recent graduate with an idea that you’d like you tell our readers about? Then we at Opinio Juris want to know about you! This July, we are planning to launch a new feature called New Voices: a two-month online symposium to run alongside our regular posts. Our goal is to give students and emerging scholars a chance to profile their work by providing a platform for fresh ideas that will hopefully stimulate discussion with our regular bloggers and commentators.

We invite submissions on any topic of international law from LL.M., Ph.D., and S.J.D. students as well as those in the early stages of their careers (e.g., post-docs, junior academics or early career practitioners within the first five years of finishing their final degree), anywhere in the world.

If you’re interested, please send a 200-word summary of your idea and your CV to opiniojurisblog [at] gmail [dot] com by May 1, 2013. If selected, we’ll let you know by mid-May. We’ll also let you know at that point when your post is scheduled to go online. Final submissions between 1000-1500 words will be required two weeks before publication for review, so at the earliest by mid-June.

If you have any questions, feel free to ask them in the comments or send us an e-mail at the address above.